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Abstract
Industrial business world has a real need to integrate industrial control systems (ICS)
with Corporate systems. The integration of these two systems has a lot of advantages
such as increased visibility of industrial control system activities, ability to use busi-
ness analysis to optimize production processes and gaining more responsiveness to the
business requirements and decisions to achieve more business competitiveness. For ex-
ample, ERP and CRM systems can directly interact with industrial processes to adjust
production based on actual needs, customer orders, stock and energy or raw material
(oil, electricity, steel ...) cost.
However, this integration introduces multiple security problems. Indeed, ICS sys-
tems have been designed with no security in mind because they have usually been
isolated. This ranges from the use of insecure protocols and technologies to the lack of
policies and human resources training on cyber-security practices. Therefore, integra-
tion exposes both ICS and Corporate Systems to major security threats. Unfortunately,
known IT security practices can not be directly applied to ICS systems because the
two types of systems are different by nature and have different requirements in terms
of operation and security.
This thesis studies the integration of ICS with Corporate systems from a security
standpoint. Our goal is to study integrated ICS systems security vulnerabilities and
suggest models and mechanisms to improve their security and protect them against
ceyberattacks.
After conducting a study on the vulnerabilities of integrated ICS systems (IICS) and
the existing security solutions, we focused on the study of defence in depth technique
and its applicability to integrated ICS systems. We defined a new generic segmentation
method for IICS, “SONICS”, which simplifies the segmentation of IICS by focusing
only on those aspects that are really significant for segmentation.
vi ABSTRACT
We next developed an improved version of SONICS, RIICS (Risk based IICS Seg-
mentation), a segmentation method for IICS systems that fills the SONICS gaps by
focusing on risk on top of technical and industrial specifications.
To complete the segmentation method, we studied segregation and access control
solutions. We studied the use of DTE (Domain and Type Enfoncement) access control
for integrated ICS segregation. We extended the initial DTE model and formalized it
to define a new flow control model for integrated ICS systems. We provided a generic
but extensible access control policy based on the generic functional model provided
by the ISA95 standard. This generic policy aims to simplify the deployment of DTE
access control and provide a good introduction to DTE concepts.
Résumé
Le monde de l’entreprise industrielle a un réel besoin d’intégrer les systèmes de contrôle
industriel (ICS) aux systèmes d’entreprise. L’intégration de ces deux systèmes présente
de nombreux avantages tels qu’une visibilité améliorée des activités du système de con-
trôle industriel, une capacité d’utiliser les techniques de Business Intelligence pour op-
timiser les processus de production et acquérir une plus grande réactivité aux exigences
et aux décisions Business pour atteindre une plus grande compétitivité commerciale.
Cependant, cette intégration introduit de multiples problèmes de sécurité. En effet,
les systèmes industriels ont été conçus sans aucune sécurité, car ils ont généralement
été isolés. Cela inclut l’utilisation de protocoles et de technologies peu sécurisés et
l’absence de politiques de sécurité et de formation des ressources humaines sur les
bonnes pratiques en cybersécurité. Par conséquent, l’intégration expose à la fois les
ICS et les systèmes d’entreprise à des menaces de sécurité majeures. Malheureusement,
les pratiques connues en matière de sécurité des IT (Information Technologies) ne
peuvent être appliquées directement aux systèmes ICS parce que les deux types de
systèmes sont différents par nature et ont des exigences fonctionnelles, opérationnelles
et de sécurité différentes.
Cette thèse étudie l’intégration des systèmes ICS avec les systèmes d’entreprise
d’un point de vue sécurité. Notre objectif est d’étudier les vulnérabilités de sécurité
des systèmes industriels intégrés et de proposer des modèles et des mécanismes pour
améliorer leur sécurité et les protéger contre les attaques complexes.
Après avoir réalisé une étude sur les vulnérabilités des systèmes ICS intégrés (IICS)
et les solutions de sécurité existantes, nous nous sommes concentrés sur l’étude de
la technique de défence en profondeur et son applicabilité aux systèmes ICS intégrés.
Nous avons alors défini une nouvelle méthode générique de segmentation pour les IICS,
“SONICS”, qui permet de simplifier la segmentation des IICS en se concentrant unique-
ment sur les aspects qui sont réellement significatifs pour la segmentation.
viii RÉSUMÉ
Nous avons ensuite développé une version améliorée de SONICS, RIICS (Risk based
IICS Segmentation), une méthode de segmentation pour les systèmes IICS qui comble
les lacunes de SONICS en se concentrant sur le risque en plus des spécificités techniques
et industrielles.
Pour compléter la méthode de segmentation, nous avons étudié les solutions de
ségrégation et de contrôle d’accès. Nous avons étudié l’utilisation du contrôle d’accès
DTE (Domain and Type Enfoncement) pour la ségrégation des ICS intégrés. Nous
avons étendu le modèle initial de DTE et l’avons formalisé pour définir un nouveau
modèle de contrôle des flux pour les systèmes ICS intégrés. Nous avons proposé une
politique de contrôle d’accès générique mais extensible basée sur le modèle fonctionnel
générique fourni par la norme ISA95. Cette politique générique vise à simplifier le
déploiement du contrôle d’accès DTE et à fournir une bonne introduction aux concepts
DTE.
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CHAPTER
1 Introduction
This chapter presents the context and the motivations of this thesis, as well as the
problem we addressed. We will present the main contributions made during these three
years of research work before we detail the structure of this manuscript.
1.1 Context and Motivations
Nowadays, one of the major challenges in industrial business world is integrating
industrial control systems (ICS) with Corporate systems and keeping the integrated
system secured. Industrial business world presently has a real need to integrate indus-
trial control systems with Corporate systems [Keith Stouffer and Hahn 2015, ISA 2013,
of France 2013]. The integration of these systems has a lot of advantages such as in-
creased visibility of industrial control system activities and ability to use business analy-
sis to optimize production processes. For example, ERP and CRM systems can commu-
nicate with industrial processes to adjust production based on actual needs, customer
orders, stock and energy or raw material cost (oil, electricity, steel ...)... ICS and Corpo-
rate systems integration ensures more responsiveness to the business requirements and
decisions which means more business competitiveness [GSM 2014, Drias et al. 2015].
However, this integration introduces multiple security problems [JUN 2010,
GSM 2014, ANSSI 2013]. Unlike Corporate systems that were designed to be pro-
tected against malevolence, ICS systems were essentially designed to protect against
failure. Cyber-security was definitely not an aspect to take into account in ICS sys-
tems because they have mostly been based on private isolated networks [ISA 2013,
Keith Stouffer and Hahn 2015]. The only security topics that might have been ad-
dressed would be related to physical security and safety. Therefore, existing ICS systems
are very predisposed to security problems. This ranges from human and organizational
problems such as the lack of staff training and security policy, to infrastructure and
architectural problems such as the use of unsecured protocols and the lack of considera-
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tion of security in architecture and design [Keith Stouffer and Hahn 2015, CSSP 2009,
Kim 2012]. For example, some devices are implemented with no security capabilities
(authentication and encryption ...) at all. Some others come with inadequate security
properties such as hard coded passwords on their firmware. They therefore cannot be
efficiently secured.
Therefore, integrating ICS and Corporate systems exposes both of them to ma-
jor security threats [GSM 2014, CSSP 2009]. Unfortunately, securing the integration
is quite challenging. In fact, most known IT (Information Technologies) security prac-
tices can not always be applied to ICS systems because the two types of systems are
different by nature and have different requirements in terms of operation and security.
On one hand, protecting business data to ensure integrity and confidentiality is the pri-
mary need in Corporate systems. On the other hand, availability and responsiveness
of real-time critical industrial processes are the main requirements in ICS systems. In
addition, ICS and enterprise worlds have always been regarded as totally two separate
systems. They have always been using different mechanisms, different technologies,
different protocols... and are, more importantly, not designed to integrate with each
other from a security point of view. ICS teams have unfortunately no knowledge about
cyber-security and IT security specialists have insufficient knowledge about industrial
systems. Therefore, securing the integration is really challenging.
In the meantime, securing integrated ICS systems is becoming one of the most
urgent concerns that disquiets not only all industrial actors but also governments.
Very important number of industrial entities and infrastructures are so critical
that any successful cyber attack on these entities can cause huge damage to busi-
ness, to environment and more severely to national security and people safety
[Keith Stouffer and Hahn 2015, Huang et al. 2009].
This thesis studies the ICS systems and Corporate systems integration from a secu-
rity standpoint. Our goal is to study integrated ICS systems vulnerabilities and suggest
new models and mechanisms to improve their security while maintaining the nominal
functioning of the systems.
1.2 Contributions
The first part of our work was to elaborate a state of the art study of Integrated
ICS (IICS) systems vulnerabilities as well as existing security countermeasures and
solutions. We set up a reference architecture of Integrated ICS systems to be the
basis of our work and help us to identify more precisely vulnerabilities and solutions
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with a special focus on Architecture and Design vulnerabilities, Communication and
Network vulnerabilities and Policy and Procedure vulnerabilities. For each identified
vulnerability we extracted the solutions proposed by other research works, compared
them and evaluate their sufficiency to achieve security objectives, their maturity, and
their implementability [Khaoula et al. 2016].
Defense-in-depth is one of the measures we studied. It is one of the most important
security techniques that are strongly recommended for Integrated ICS systems. Unfor-
tunately, we could not find detailed and precise information about how to implement
it. Defense-in-depth is mainly based on segmentation and segregation. Segmentation
is the operation of segmenting a system into multiple security zones that can be sepa-
rately controlled, monitored and protected. Segregation is controlling communication
through the security zones boundaries based on a set of predefined rules. The segmen-
tation of an IICS (Integrated ICS) may be based on various types of characteristics
such as functional characteristics, business impact, risk levels, or other requirements
defined by the organization. Although many research works have proposed some seg-
mentation solutions, these solutions are unfortunately not generic enough and do not
sufficiently take into account all of the IICS specificity such as their heterogeneous
technical and functional nature as well as real industrial constraints and conditions.
Besides, the aspects that should be considered for segmentation are not obvious.
Therefore, We defined a new generic IICS Segmentation method “SONICS” that
aims to simplify IICS segmentation. This new method is based on a simple meta-model
of IICS systems that allows to describe systems’ elements by focusing only on aspects
that are really meaningful for segmentation. Some of the meta-model aspects require
performing a risk analysis to describe more precisely the system. The method itself con-
sists of multiple cycles where new potential security zones are progressively identified
based on one aspect of the meta-model at a time. The new identified zones are kept or
not depending on a constraints analysis performed on IICS elements that are involved
in the new potential zones. The constraints analysis allows to check that the creation
of a new identified zone does not lead to a violation of the system's functional require-
ments nor to a technical cost overrun [Khaoula et al. 2017, Khaoula et al. 2018b].
The next step was to extend the method to cover more security aspects. We believe
that the concept of risk is one of the best ways to characterize a system’s components
from a security standpoint. We therefore created RIICS (Risk based IICS Segmenta-
tion), a new segmentation method for IICS systems that fills the gaps of SONICS and
tries to simplify security zones identification by focusing on systems technical indus-
trial specificities and risk. The risk associated with data, components or processes is
assessed using a slightly adapted version of the EBIOS risk assessment method for
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which the risk is based on the probability and gravity of the possible threat scenarios
[Khaoula et al. 2018a].
Furthermore, defense-in-depth can not only be achieved with segmentation. Iden-
tifying security zones is necessary but not enough. Communication flows through the
zones boundaries have to be filtered. We are therefore convinced that our segmentation
method should be completed by a segregation solution.
The issue with ICS integration represents a new use case in terms of flow filtering
mechanisms. When integrating the two systems, it is necessary to:
• Apply strict controls on all flows, especially on communication with other networks
• Respect the timing requirements of industrial systems
• Allow to customize packet inspection to extend supported protocols
• Simplify the definition of control rules to make it easier for administrators, espe-
cially industrial system administrators because they are less familiar with security
concepts.
We therefore setup about studying possible segregation solutions to improve flows
controls of integrated ICS systems. We decided to use and enhance the Domain and
Type Enforcement (DTE) access control for Integrated ICS segregation. DTE is an
access control mechanism that holds promise to provide needed flexibility to respond
to the requirements listed above. We have extended the original DTE model, and
formalized it to define a new model of flow controls for integrated systems. We also
proposed a generic but extensible access control policy based on the generic functional
model provided by ISA95. This generic policy is intended to simplify the deployment
of DTE access control and provide a good introduction to the concepts of domains and
types of packets for administrators.
1.3 Organization of the dissertation
Chapter 2 – IICS Reference Architecture – ICS systems configurations are nu-
merous and cannot be covered by a single study. We therefore had to limit the scope
of the study by defining a reference architecture to be the basis of our research. It will
be presented in Chapter 2.
Chapter 3 – Problem & State of the Art – This chapter provides a state of
the art study of the existing ICS systems vulnerabilities and security countermeasures.
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We carried out an in-depth review of vulnerabilities and solutions. We classified them
and identify issues that are not yet fully covered.
Chapter 4 – SONICS segmentation method – This chapter focuses on our
Segmentation Method SONICS. It formalizes and explains the main concepts of the
method, and presents the test tools and results.
Chapter 5 – RIICS: Risk based IICS segmentation Method – This chapter
presents RIICS an improved version of the SONICS method, that takes into account
more aspects for segmentation.
Chapter 6 – DTE Access control model for IICS systems – This chapter
presents our study of using DTE for controlling ICS and Corporate systems flows. We
present our new DTE model and a generic ruleset based on the generic model provided
by ISA95 [ISA 2004].
Chapter 7 – Conclusions and Perspectives – This chapter concludes the dis-
sertation by summarizing the contributions and presenting the different perspectives
for possible further work.

CHAPTER
2 IICS Reference
Architecture
2.1 Introduction
“Industrial Control System” (ICS) is a general term that encompasses several types of
control systems used in industrial production, including Supervisory Control And Data
Acquisition (SCADA) systems [Cai et al. 2008, Boyer 2009], Distributed Control Sys-
tems (DCS), and other control system configurations often found in industrial sectors
and critical infrastructures [Keith Stouffer and Hahn 2015].
Integrating an ICS system with a Corporate system consists of interconnecting
components from the ICS system to components from the Corporate system for some
functional or technical purpose ensuring their communication, their interoperability,
their security as well as the whole system security [Cai et al. 2008, Huang et al. 2009,
Ten et al. 2010]. Unfortunately,Integrated ICS systems are very different from one or-
ganization to another. The components to interconnect from both sides depend on the
organizations functional and technical needs. For example, business specialists may
need more visibility on industrial activity to be able to make more appropriate deci-
sions. Business analysts may want to interconnect their business intelligence tools to
the industrial system to make use of these tools capabilities. There are also several other
technical interconnections that may be needed for urbanization or cost optimization
such as printing streams, DNS, emailing flows [GSM 2014]... Not only the integration
requirements differ from one organization to another, but existing ICS and Corporate
systems architectures are also so various that studying all the possible configurations
is unthinkable.
Therefore, to study Integrated ICS security topics, we set up a reference architecture
that was used as the basis of our studies. It is, moreover, itself a useful asset for
researchers, engineers and architects who are interested in ICS and Corporate systems
integration.
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For the rest of this document, we will use the term “IICS” to refer to “integrated
ICS”. An IICS is an ICS that is integrated with its organization’s Corporate system.
2.2 Existing ICS systems architectures
ICS systems have various architectures and infrastructure configurations depending on
different aspects such as the industrial sector, the production activities or the size of
the organization.
2.2.1 Industrial sectors
Industrial sector affects industrial system properties and needs and has a direct impact
on the infrastructure configuration and architecture of an ICS. There are two main
industry sectors as illustrated in Figure 2.1 [Force and Initiative 2013]:
Figure 2.1 – The main industrial Sectors.
• Manufacturing industries
In this type of industry, the main activity of a plant is the manufacturing of some
type of goods. There are two types of manufacturing industries:
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– Process-based manufacturing industries
They include Continuous manufacturing processes such as fuel and steam
flow in a power plant, and Batch manufacturing processes such as Food man-
ufacturing.
– Discrete-based manufacturing industries
They conduct a series of steps on a single device to create the end product
as in electronic and mechanical parts assembly.
• Distribution industries
Include all distribution based industries such as water distribution and wastewater
collection systems.
The two industry families have different characteristics and needs. For example,
in terms of localization, manufacturing industries are usually located within a con-
fined factory or plant-centric area, whereas distribution industries are geographically
dispersed. Besides, communication in manufacturing industry are usually performed
using LAN while distribution industry systems usually communicate through WAN
[Keith Stouffer and Hahn 2015, ISA 2013].
2.2.2 Geographical distribution
Geographical distribution is a key aspect that directly impacts an ICS architectural
configuration. There are three types of ICS systems [ANSSI 2013, ISA 2012] with re-
gard to this aspect as illustrated in Figure 2.2:
Figure 2.2 – The types of ICS systems according to geographical distribution.
• Distributed control systems
Distributed control industrial systems control multiple industrial equipments and
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subsystems that are scattered over a large geographical extent (such as a region or
a country territory). To communicate with each other, the subsystems are mainly
interconnected using wired or wireless WAN infrastructures (Satellite, GSM, In-
ternet...). This type of control systems are usually found in transport, railways,
electricity and water distribution industries.
• Local industrial control systems
This control systems of this type have a limited geographical extent (usually within
one building). They very often contain a local area network (LAN) usually based
on Ethernet/TCP/IP. The LAN provides a unified communication link between
all the components of the network. This type of systems is used in process-based
manufacturing industries such as food manufacturing.
• Isolated manufacturing machinery
Some manufacturing systems do not need to be connected with a network as they
already integrate all the needed components (sensors, actuators, programmable
automate...) and thus are completely autonomous. Only direct point to point
communication by means of serial cable or USB is possible when it is needed
to program the system or update its firmware.
2.3 IICS reference architecture
To state the problem clearly, we chose to focus our research works on “Local Manu-
facturing industrial control” systems. Therefore we set up a reference architecture of a
quite representative system to be the basis of our studies.
Figure 2.3 – Functional Hierarchical model [ISA95] [ISA 2004].
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Our reference architecture is based on the standardized hierarchical functional
model provided by ISA-95 [ISA 1999]. This model (Figure 2.3) depicts the different
functional levels of Integrated ICS systems and highlights the relationship between
Business and Industrial activities. In other words, it provides a high level picture of
the functional architecture of an IICS with a special focus on the ICS and Corpo-
rate system functional integration at the interface between Level 4 and Level 3 where
industrial and business functions are integrated.
Figure 2.4 – IICS Reference Architecture.
IICS functions involved in the 5 levels listed above, are implemented using multiple
software and hardware components. Figure 2.4 provides a quite complete list of these
components relating them to the hierarchical model.
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2.3.1 Level 4: Enterprise and business system
This level includes the functions involved in the business-related activities as well as
management functions. It is the Corporate system zone where lie all the enterprise’s
components such as IT applications, email servers, ERP systems...
• CRM: CRMs are software applications that allow the processing of the sales plan
with customers as well as the marketing management. They are generally "front-
office" solutions, in opposition to "back-office" tools such as Enterprise Resource
Planning solutions (ERP).
• ERP: is a category of business-management software, typically a suite of inte-
grated applications that an organization can use to collect, store, manage and
interpret data from many business activities (including: product planning, cost,
manufacturing or service delivery, marketing and sales, inventory management and
shipping and payment).
2.3.2 Level 3: Operational Management
This level includes the functions involved in managing the workflows to produce the
desired end products. The main components of this level are:
• MES: Manufacturing Execution System (or MOM - Manufacturing Operations
Management), is a computerized system used in manufacturing, to track and doc-
ument a manufacturing process. The aim of an MES is to make the value-adding
processes transparent [Kletti 2007]. MES might be seen as an intermediate between
an ERP system, and a SCADA or a process control system.
• MDM: Meter Data Management is a software system that performs long-term
storage, management and processing for the great amount of data delivered by
smart metering systems.[Niyato and Wang 2012]
• DMS: A Distribution Management System is a collection of applications to mon-
itor and control the entire distribution network in a safe and efficient way. It
also serves as an operations platform, automating tasks and filtering information
for the operator.[Thierry Godart 2012] DMSs use real-time data and provide all
information on a single console at the control centre in an integrated way.
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2.3.3 Level 2 : Supervisory Control
This level includes the functions involved in monitoring and controlling the physical
process. The main components of this level are:
• SCADA: (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition): It integrates data acqui-
sition systems with data transmission systems and HMI software to provide a
centralized monitoring and control system for multiple process inputs and out-
puts. They are designed to collect field data, transfer them to central computer
facility, and display information to the operator graphically or textually. This al-
lows the operator to monitor or control an entire system from a central location
in near real time [Boyer 2009]. Supervisory control layer contains the top level
components of SCADA to which we refer as control centers.
• Control Centers: A Control center is the central part of a SCADA system. It
collects and logs information received from other SCADA components and may
generate actions based on detected events. It is also responsible of centralized
alarming, trend analyses and reporting [Keith Stouffer and Hahn 2015]. It is com-
posed of the following elements:
– SCADA control Server: (Usually called the master): It is a software service
which connects with field devices using industrial protocols, exposes acquired
supervision data, and sends controls.
– HMI: Used by operators to monitor and control other SCADA components.
It is a GUI (Graphical User Interface) that retrieves data from the SCADA
server to create visual reports and perform alarming.
– Historian: A data storage server that is used to store history data.
– Engineering workstations: It is a computing unit, generally an ordinary
computer, that industrial engineers mainly use to configure industrial control
components (especially PLCs and RTUs...).
– OPC Classic: It is a software interface standard that allows Windows pro-
grams to communicate with industrial hardware devices. OPC is implemented
in server/client pairs.
∗ The OPC server: It is a software program that converts the hardware
communication protocol used by a PLC into the OPC protocol.
∗ The OPC client: It is any program that needs to connect to an indus-
trial hardware component. It uses the OPC server to get data from or
send commands to the hardware.
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2.3.4 Level 1: Local or Basic Control
Level 1 includes the functions involved in sensing and manipulating the physical pro-
cess. It is mainly composed of field sites where a set of controllers are directly connected
to the sensors and actuators of the process. This level also includes process monitoring
equipment.
• Field Sites: Field sites are local or remote and are composed of devices directly
responsible of data acquisition, logical operations and controls. a field site contains
generally:
– One or more PLC or RTU which are central sophisticated devices that
interact with sensors and actuators in the site (more details about PLCs and
RTUs are provided below).
– Sometimes, a local computer connected to RTU/PLC for configuration.
– PLCs (Programmable Logic Controller) are digital devices used for automa-
tion of industrial electro-mechanical processes. They connect to sensors in
the process and convert their signals to digital data.
– RTUs (Remote Terminal Unit) are microprocessor-controlled electronic de-
vices that interface sensors and actuators by transmitting telemetry data
to the SCADA Server, and by using messages from the master supervisory
system to control connected objects.
– Differences between PLC and RTU:
∗ RTUs are considered more suitable for wider geographical telemetry, be-
cause RTUs are usually equipped with wireless communication; whereas
PLCs are more suitable for local control (in building industry) and are
especially designed for output arrangements and multiple inputs.
∗ IEC 61131-3 is used more by PLCs, and RTUs use other alternative
proprietary tools [Tiegelkamp and John 1995].
IEC 61131-3 is a part of the open international standard IEC 61131
for programmable logic controllers, and was first published in December
1993 by the IEC. The current (third) edition was published in February
2013. Part 3 of IEC 61131 deals with basic software architecture and
programming languages of the control program within PLC. It defines
two graphical and two textual programming language standards.
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2.3.5 Level 0: Industrial Process
Level 0 is the actual industrial physical process. It includes sensors and actuators
directly connected to the process.
2.4 Communication flows
Communication between components is also a very important key aspect to be consid-
ered. It especially focuses on physical and logical interconnections between components
and on the way they communicate (protocols).
Field data acquisition requires using protocols adapted for real-time communication
such as: ModBus, DNP3 and Profinet. Physical communication in SCADA systems
is usually based on Ethernet or Serial links. As for communication between ICS and
Corporate system components, it depends on the technologies used on both sides. Most
commonly, web services, FTP, and SQL are used for business components while other
protocols such as SMTP are used for technical needs. Table 2.5 below lists the most
common communication flows as well as the most used protocols in an IICS system.
2.5 Conclusion
In order to delimit the scope of our study, we defined a reference architecture to be
the basis of our work. This architecture will help us to focus on a single type of ICS
architecture, trying to study its security issues and provide some solutions. Studying
all ICS architectures as part of a single project is not conceivable because they are
very different in terms of functionality, operation and infrastructure. We decided to
work with Manufacturing industries under a local industrial control systems, because
on one hand, they are widely used, and on the other hand, they are easier to simulate.
However, security requirements of manufacturing systems are quite different from other
critical infrastructures, despite the similarities they share with them. Manufacturing
systems can be attacked at different stages, from early design to the final inspection,
anywhere in the supply chain because they are highly integrated into the product’s life
cycle. The development of effective security solutions for these systems requires specific
research [Rosinger and Uslar 2013].
Our reference architecture has been defined in accordance with the standardized
hierarchical functional model. We have defined examples of components at each func-
tional level, and we have also set up a grid of communications. This architecture is only
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Figure 2.5 – Examples of IICS data flows.
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a reference “template” that is not necessarily intended to be used in its current form
for all our work and tests. It mainly provides a foundation to study generic problems
and suggest generic solutions.

CHAPTER
3 Problem & State of the
Art
The integration of ICS and Corporate systems raises many security issues if no
countermeasures are taken. According to several research works and security guides
[Keith Stouffer and Hahn 2015, ISA 2013, of France 2013], Integrated ICS systems
may be exposed to a wide range of vulnerabilities. We have studied these vulnera-
bilities in order to assess the state of the art and identify security issues that are not
(or not completely) addressed yet. We are most interested in the vulnerabilities that
are directly related to the integration of the ICS.
3.1 Existing ICS systems security problems
ICS and Corporate systems integration introduces multiple security problems. Unlike
Corporate systems that were designed to be protected against malevolence, ICS systems
were essentially designed to protect against failure [Keith Stouffer and Hahn 2015,
ISA 2013]. Cyber-security was definitely not an aspect taken into account in ICS
systems because they have mostly been based on private isolated unique net-
works that used proprietary communication protocols. The only security topics
that might have been addressed would be related to physical security and safety
[Cherdantseva et al. 2016]. Security was primarily achieved by controlling physical
access to system components [DeSmit et al. 2017a, Cruz et al. 2015]. Therefore, ex-
isting ICS systems are very predisposed to security problems. Predisposing condi-
tions include human and organizational problems such as lack of staff training or
lack of security policy, infrastructure and architectural problems such as the use
of unsecured protocols, lack of consideration of security in architecture and design
[Keith Stouffer and Hahn 2015, Cruz et al. 2015, Kim 2012].
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3.1.1 Architectural and technological security problems
ICS systems have multiple technical and architectural security problems. First, most
industrial equipment has no security capabilities (authentication and encryption
...) at all [Cruz et al. 2015]. They sometimes come with inadequate security prop-
erties such as hard coded passwords on their firmware [Johari and Sharma 2012,
Nicholson et al. 2012]. They thus cannot be efficiently secured. Besides, most proto-
cols used in industrial systems (Modbus/TCP [Drias et al. 2015], Ethernet/IP, DNP3
[Fovino et al. 2010, Drias et al. 2015] ...) are not designed with security in mind and,
worse, the most vulnerable among them are sometimes employed despite their known
vulnerabilities. For example, DCOM, a protocol used for OPC, uses RPC which
opens multiple ports to establish communication making firewalls configuration diffi-
cult [Galloway and Hancke 2013]. Furthermore, industrial control systems are increas-
ingly using wireless communications which can introduce additional vulnerabilities
[Leith and Piper 2013].
In addition, most of ICS architectures do not make use of segmentation which
means that all the components in the system are on the same low level of security
[ANSSI 2013]. Authentication, encryption of exchanged and stored data, logging and
traceability mechanisms are mostly absent [Obregon 2015]. Even for the most carefully
designed ICS systems, cyber-security is not seriously applied. For example, proprietary
protocols are mistakenly assumed to be secure and architectural choices tend to be
made without taking security aspects into account [DeSmit et al. 2017b].
Technical support and maintenance are more often provided remotely by vendors,
eliminating the need for an internal support team. However, this creates a significant
angle of attack, especially when vendors’ end-users do not comply with the minimal
security best practices. For example, vendors sometimes provide systems with dial-
up modems to allow remote access in order to reduce the “maintenance burden” of
technical support in the field. In many cases, cyber-security controls are not activated
by end users simply for practical reasons. In other cases, remote access is provided to
support staff with administrator access to the ICS. Some passwords used for remote
access are sometimes the same for all the clients and too frequently are not changed by
the end users. Password cracking “freeware” can be used to gain access to such systems
by exploiting remote access vulnerabilities [Leith and Piper 2013].
Furthermore, with the recent trend of using commercial off the shell (COTS) tech-
nologies (especially open protocols such as TCP/IP protocols stack and ordinary win-
dows computers) and Internet of Things (IoT) [Cherdantseva et al. 2016, Evans 2011],
ICS systems are more vulnerable than ever before because these technologies are very
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well known by attackers. Popular automated software tools used to analyze networks
and vulnerabilities, that are of minimal impact on corporate networks, can, in contrast,
cause huge damage to ICS networks [Hildick-Smith 2006]. For example, [Leverett 2011]
identified 3,920 ICS devices in the United States that were accessible via the Internet
in a recent study. ICS devices are therefore subject not only to targeted attacks, but
also to inadvertent attacks [Larkin et al. 2014a]. Figure 3.1 illustrates the growth of the
number of recorded attacks in relation to the number of exposed devices. Cyber-attacks
have drastically increased since the early 1980’s. As the number of attacks grows, their
visibility decreases and maliciousness increases. Over the past decades, this has been
seen in various industrial sectors.
Figure 3.1 – Growth of networked devices [Evans 2011] and cyber-attack visibility and
maliciousness trends [Bayuk et al. 2011, Watin-Augouard et al. 2011]
In addition, internet-based Computer Aided Engineering (CAE) tools, such as cloud
computing software as a service (SaaS) are being adopted introducing new vulnerabili-
ties [DeSmit et al. 2017b]. And in some cases, there also may be some physical security
issues such as unprotected easy to access physical points that can be exploited by
malicious persons.
3.1.2 Human and Policy related security problems
ICS security problems are not limited to architectural and technological issues. Human
errors are an other important source of vulnerabilities. They may result in unintended
attacks, intended internal and external social engineering attacks. Attacks by internal
agents are more frequent than attacks by external ones [Henrie 2013, Sacramento 2007,
Poulsen 2009].
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Human errors are the most exploited angle of attack of most known cyber-security
attacks achieved on industrial systems so far [CSSP 2009]. Therefore, even with archi-
tectural and technical vulnerabilities addressed, human imprudence remains one of the
most threatening source of vulnerabilities.
Actually, the current ICS systems human related security problems are direct con-
sequences of two factors.
Lack of training
There is a serious lack of training and sensitisation among ICS personnel. Train-
ing for people working with ICS systems is often limited to industrial practices and
promotes misconception about tools and their fallibility [Nicholson et al. 2012] and
does not raise engineers and designers’awareness of the threats of cyber-attacks on ICS
systems [Wells et al. 2014].
Lack of security policy
ICS generally lack well-defined globally applied security policies that establish suit-
able security procedures and constrains human resources to adopt convenient security
practices. Unlike Corporate systems that are governed by very well established secu-
rity standards [ISA 2013, Force and Initiative 2013, ANSSI 2013, of France 2013] and
controlled by well defined entities (ISD: IT System Department), ICS systems may be
managed and maintained by different departments (automation, maintenance, indus-
trial processing, Information Systems Department(ISD)...) and lack standardisation.
This heavily contributes to the persisting of human related security vulnerabilities.
As a result, the definition of security policy, enforcement procedures and vulnerabil-
ity checks, risk assessment and system security audit are not carried out. Below some
examples of human related issues:
• Using common passwords, [Leith and Piper 2013]
• Using default passwords, [Leith and Piper 2013]
• Using USB sticks passwords,
• Connecting external devices to the ICS network [Leith and Piper 2013]
• Keeping temporary accesses open because of the absence of security supervision
[Leith and Piper 2013]
• No screensaver or mandatory log off requirements [Leith and Piper 2013].
• No access rights management giving users the highest level of access. For example,
in one large industrial plant, more than 100 technical employees had high-level
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access, while after a risk assessment, this number was reduced to 10 employees
who really needed that high-level access for their work [Leith and Piper 2013].
• Remote vendors maintenance users access rights. They often are granted high level
of access regardless their tasks’ requirements [Leith and Piper 2013].
More alarming, as a result of the non-existence of routinely scheduled security checks
and attack detection procedures, the median number of days between the onset of
a cyber-attack was reported and its detection in an organization was over 200 days
[FireEye 2015]. Besides, 69% of the attacks recorded on ICS systems were not discov-
ered by the victims themselves, but by third parties such as law enforcement entities
and clients [FireEye 2015].
In summary, current ICS systems combine classical technology vulnerabilities,
COTS vulnerabilities, industrial protocols and more importantly human related vulner-
abilities. While the situation has changed over the last decade, and a number of stan-
dards and directives dealing with the cyber security of SCADA systems have emerged
[Cherdantseva et al. 2016], the threat of cyber attacks on ICS systems is not being fully
addressed, leaving facilities and entire supply chains vulnerable [DeSmit et al. 2017a].
3.1.3 Impact of ICS security issues
An attack can alter design files or process parameters to bring some parts out of
specification. It could also modify the quality control (QC) system to avoid proper
quality assessment. Such attacks can disrupt the product, the design process and ad-
versely affect a product’s design intent, performance, or quality. The consequences of
a security incident, whether related to an attack or an error, may include compliance
and legal issues, financial and physical damage. An incident can also result in defec-
tive products that do not meet the design specifications. This can result in delays
in product launch, equipment failure, increasing warranty costs, loss of clients trust
[Wells et al. 2014]. More importantly, such incidents constitute a threat to the human
safety of operators and consumers [DeSmit et al. 2017b]. Recent case studies at Vir-
ginia Tech have shown the ease of executing such cyber-physical attacks. In the first
case study [Wells et al. 2014], the tool path files were modified in a subtractive manu-
facturing operation, while the design files for an additive manufacturing process were
modified in the second case study [Sturm et al. 2014].
Miller and Rowe’s [Miller and Rowe 2012] analysis states that the number of cyber
attacks against ICS systems increases over time. In 2010, the Industrial Security Inci-
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dent Inventory (ISI) identified 161 incidents, with an additional 10 new incidents each
quarter. In 2013, the RISI database already contained 240 incidents recorded between
2001 and the end of 2012 [RISI 2013]. In addition, an in-depth study of the current state
of cyber-security of ICS systems, based on a series of interviews with a large number of
experts, confirmed that cyber threats are really increasing [Henrie 2013]. In addition,
the critical manufacturing sector accounted for the most security incidents reported to
the Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT) in 2015
[ICS-CERT 2015].
Examples of cyber-attacks are quite numerous, expanding across a variety of fields.
In 1982, The “logic bomb” was reportedly inserted in the Trans-Siberian pipeline’s
control software. This attack changed pump and valve settings, causing a massive
explosion [Miller and Rowe 2012].
In 2003, a slammer worm penetrated a network at the Davies-Besse nuclear plant
in Ohio [Guan et al. 2011, Patel et al. 2005] and a computer virus named Sobig shut
down train signalling systems in Florida [Miller and Rowe 2012].
In 2006, a hacker penetrated the operation system of a water treatment facility in
Harrisburg, USA [Guan et al. 2011, Patel et al. 2005] and the Browns Ferry nuclear
plant in Alabama was manually shut down due to the overload of network traffic
[Nicholson et al. 2012].
In 2007, a dismissed employee installed unauthorised software on the SCADA sys-
tem of the Tehama Colusa Canal Authority [Miller and Rowe 2012].
In 2010, the Stuxnet computer worm struck the Iranian nuclear facility causing the
failure of almost one-fifth of all centrifuges [Miller and Rowe 2012]. Stuxnet allegedly
destroyed as many as 1000 Iranian high speed centrifuges used for uranium enrichment.
Specifically, the life-spans of these centrifuges were significantly reduced by periodi-
cally changing their rotational speeds [Albright et al. 2010, Vincent et al. 2015]. This
attack was successful because it was able to display misleading equipment readings
(readings indicated no problems) to operators [Cherry and Constantine 2011]. Stuxnet
was a game-changer, it attracted the world’s attention to cyber threats to ICS systems
by drawing a vivid and horrifying picture of the consequences of a cyber attack on
industrial systems.
In 2016, there was an attack on a power grid which cut power to over 100,000 people
[Tuptuk and Hailes 2016].
These examples demonstrate that no system is beyond the reach of cyber-attackers,
and ICS systems are no exception.
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3.2 Integration security challenges
Achieving integration, from a security point of view, is laborious because securing
ICS with using only known security techniques and solutions is fairly challenging. In-
tegration relies on efforts of both ICS and Corporate systems engineers. However, ICS
teams have unfortunately no knowledge about cyber-security and IT security special-
ists have insufficient knowledge about industrial systems. In addition, addressing the
integrated system security needs cannot be accomplished using only known IT security
skills because ICS and Corporate systems have very different nature and requirements
[(NDIA) 2014, Vincent et al. 2015].
3.2.1 ICS and Corporate systems have different security ex-
pectations
ICS and Corporate systems are very different by their nature and have different
security properties and expectations. ICS security focuses on availability, plant protec-
tion, plant operation, control complexity and time-critical components response while
Corporate security mainly focuses on protecting information. In other words, in ICS
systems, availability outweighs integrity and confidentiality while these two properties
are more important in Corporate systems.
3.2.2 Technical security challenges
ICS OT and enterprise IT systems have always been regarded as totally two sepa-
rate areas. They have always been using different mechanisms, different technologies,
different protocols... and are, more importantly, not designed to integrate with each
other from a security standpoint.
While Corporate system remains protectable thanks to the expertise we have in IT
technologies security, ICS system can not profit from this knowledge because IT secu-
rity measures are not directly applicable to industrial systems. ICS systems security
expectations are different from Corporate systems and industrial heterogeneous equip-
ment and protocols particularities are not supported by the existing security solutions
[Drias et al. 2015, Sicard et al. 2018]. In addition, ICS systems have neither testing nor
staging environments to test security measures and perform audit without disturbing
“production” industrial processes [DeSmit et al. 2017b]. Unfortunately, duplicating an
ICS system for the purpose of testing security solutions is significantly expensive and
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technically complicated due to sector inter-dependencies, customized system configu-
rations, and massive use of proprietary protocols still in use [Larkin et al. 2014b].
ICS systems are, also, very demanding in terms of timing requirements since
they heavily implement real-time critical exchanges. Because of these very resource-
consuming timing requirements and because of the oldness of ICS equipment, in-
dustrial control devices usually have very limited memory and computing capabil-
ities to execute security processing such as anti-virus and firewalls. Industrial sys-
tems are moreover structurally and operationally constraining for the security up-
dates deployment [Etigowni et al. 2016, Huda et al. 2018a]. Applications and drivers
inter-compatibility requires keeping them on very precise not up to date versions
which makes security patches installation very complicated. Furthermore, life time
of system components is usually 3-4 times longer [Keith Stouffer and Hahn 2015,
Cheminod et al. 2013] and equipment renewal has a quite long periodicity (some-
times around 20 years [Obregon 2015, Cheminod et al. 2013, Nicholson et al. 2012,
Cherdantseva et al. 2016]) and is relatively expensive which makes industrial systems
modernization a difficult decision to make. Even when system modernization is ac-
cepted, it is still necessary that industrial equipment manufacturers add security capa-
bilities to their products without altering their nominal operation. On the other side,
existing security solutions (firewalls, IDS ...) and techniques (segregation, segmenta-
tion, authentication mechanisms...) must also be adapted to industrial systems context
[Patel et al. 2005, Cherdantseva et al. 2016].
3.2.3 Policy security challenges
ICS and Corporate systems have always formed two separate entities managed by
different teams. Corporate systems security policies are significantly more mature than
ICS’s ones when they exist. The main difficulty is to define a common security policy
that takes into account Corporate and ICS specificity. Corporate security management
teams are more qualified to define this common security policy but they do not have
enough experience with ICS networks. Defining a concise efficient global IICS security
policy is hence far from being straightforward.
In ICS systems, security is often preceded by safety, reliability, robustness and
maintainability leaving little or no resources for security goals. In [Park and Lee 2014],
the authors discuss a need for an update of well established international security
standards such as NIST SP 800-53 and ISO 27001 in order to bring the safety and
security requirements together in the context of ICS systems.
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3.3 Existing solutions
We conducted an extensive study of integrated ICS systems vulnerabilities as well
as the solutions proposed by numerous guides and research works to protect against
these vulnerabilities. We tried to evaluate their maturity, their implementability and
their efficiency. Our objective was to identify topics and issues that are not yet fully
addressed to work on them.
The proposed security solutions and countermeasures can be grouped into three
families [ISA 2013] as illustrated in Figure 3.2:
Figure 3.2 – Countermeasures families.
- Measures on “People”: Assuring personnel awareness and training,
- Measures on “Process”: Defining security policies and procedures as well as
identifying the real security needs,
- Measures on “Technology”: Securing equipment and technologies.
3.3.1 Policy measures
A range of standards and normative documents attending ICS systems security has
been produced over the years. In 2007, the US President’s Critical Infrastructure
Protection Board and the Department of Energy outlined the steps an organisation
must undertake to improve the security of its ICS networks in a booklet named “21
Steps to Improve Cyber Security of SCADA Networks” [of Energy et al. 2007] which
provides guidelines to setup security procedures in order to protect critical systems.
In 2008, the Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) produced a
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Good Practice Guide for Process Control and SCADA Security (CPNI) encapsulat-
ing best security practices especially in terms of procedures. In 2008, NIST released
a quite complete guide on a wide range of security issues, and technical, operational
and management security controls for ICS systems. The guide was updated in 2011
[Stouffer et al. 2011]. In 2013, the European Union Agency for Network and Informa-
tion Security (ENISA) released the recommendations for Europe on SCADA patching
(ENISA, 2013) while in 2014, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation
(NERC) developed a wide range of standards covering many aspects of ICS cyber se-
curity (NERG, 2014). A more extensive overview of SCADA-related security standards
is provided in [Miller and Rowe 2012, Igure et al. 2006, Nicholson et al. 2012] .
According to [Force and Initiative 2013, ISA 2013], effort should be put on defining
an IICS security policy that satisfy two main conditions:
• The global IICS security policy should be globally applicable.
• The global security policy should remedy the ICS system security policy problems.
Figure 3.3 – Policy Measures Categories.
ICS security policy and procedures should be established to ensure effective imple-
mentation and application of security measures. Policy and procedures reflect appli-
cable federal laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and
guidance” [Force and Initiative 2013]. IICS security policies and procedures should be
set up in accordance with the organizational risk management strategy. They can be
categorized into four categories (Figure 3.3) depending on the organization’s area and
the level in which they are applied:
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• General Security Policy
The first policy category to establish is the general organization’s security pol-
icy and procedures. This type of policies should fundamentally address “system
security plan” to define security requirements and describe the system, “security
assessment and authorization” to define assessment procedures and responsibilities
and “system and service acquisition” to manage resources allocation and funding.
This category of policies is necessary for integrated ICS as they help to correctly
define and validate the security scope.
• Security Measures Policies
The second category is the security measures policies and procedures. This type
addresses system and communication protection, access control, identification and
authentication, system and information integrity and media protection to regu-
late architectural and technical security controls. These policies facilitate security
solutions design and implementation.
• Operations and Maintenance Policy
As for the third category, it manages operations and maintenance aspects. Poli-
cies from this category address purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management
commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance of “audit
and accountability”, “configuration management”, “contingency planning”, “inci-
dent response” and “maintenance” facets of the system. Integrated ICS systems
have to take these policies into account at the design and build time in order to
ensure facilitate monitoring and maintenance.
• Physical and People Policies
The last category consists of physical and people policies. This set of policies
should focus on “physical and environment protection”, “personnel security” and
importantly “awareness and personnel training”.
Research works and standards that address the issue of Integrated ICS security,
generally cover very well “people” and “process” security aspects. Multiple groups of
measures are proposed for which important guidance on security policies and proce-
dures is provided. At least, they can be used as a check list that helps to select adequate
“people” and “policy” measures for the system to be secured.
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3.3.2 Technological measures
Integrated ICS system include both cyber and physical processes. The technological
security problems of ICS are related to different levels of the system. They can be
associated with low-level elements such as the electronic implementation of devices, or
with the protocols design, as well as with the architectural choices and the applicative
logic of the components. Many research studies on ICS security have been conducted
and many of them have come up with a wide range of solutions that address these
different types of problems. The proposed solutions sometimes are generic and at other
times very specific. These solutions can be grouped into two groups:
Low level security solutions
ICS communication security
ICS networks are subject to various security problems and can be quite easily at-
tacked [Ashibani and Mahmoud 2017]. Most of the protocols and network equipment
used within these systems do not provide an appropriate level of security. For example,
most industrial protocols do not provide basic security features such as encryption and
authentication.
Therefore, many research projects have been focusing on the security of commu-
nications and networks within industrial systems trying to design new solutions that
address some of these issues. These studies mainly propose solutions to strengthen the
integrity and confidentiality of the communications as well as access controls usually
by using low level authentication and authorization mechanisms, but with strong focus
on availability and timing requirements.
Some studies such as [Keith Stouffer and Hahn 2015, Shahzad et al. 2015,
Diovu and Agee 2017, Diovu and Agee 2017] propose secure industrial protocols
often as new versions of the most commonly used industrial protocols. Many others
[Premnath and Haas 2015, Vegh and Miclea 2014] propose new authentication mech-
anisms and key agreement solutions. Attack detection and network access control
mechanisms also are very important subjects that are addressed by many research
studies [Cheminod et al. 2016, Zvabva et al. 2018, Parra et al. 2019, Li et al. 2018]
that propose new firewalls and IDS/IPS solutions. More detailed presentation and
discussion of ICS networks security solutions will be provided in section 3.5 as a part
of our study of the state of the art on Integrated ICS segregation solutions.
Smart objects and automation tools security
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Devices with smart capabilities such as PLCs, actuators, intelligent electronic de-
vices (IEDs) are increasingly being used in modern industrial control systems and are
connected over IoT (Internet of Things) platform [Huda et al. 2018b].
Such devices mainly are in charge of collecting and processing data and issuing com-
mands in order to monitor physical industrial processes [Ashibani and Mahmoud 2017].
They sometimes implement quite complex decision making logic to perform supervi-
sion, monitoring and control functions to ensure that industrial processes are correctly
and optimally executed. For such type of devices, availability, integrity, confidential-
ity and trust management are important security properties to ensure. However, with
small computing capabilities [Li and Da Xu 2017, Lu and Da Xu 2019], theses devices
lack important security features such as authentication and encryption which results in
serious vulnerabilities as they are connected by Internet and sometimes over wireless
networks [Ashibani and Mahmoud 2017].
Many research works have been studying smart industrial objects trying to find
solutions for their security issues. A large part of these works propose new lightweight
encryption, access control and authentication mechanisms specifically designed to cor-
rectly perform despite the limited resources of the smart industrial objects. For exam-
ple, [Premnath and Haas 2015] presents a new solution to use small cryptographic keys
in asymmetric encryption for WSN. [Trappe et al. 2015] propose a lightweight authen-
tication protocol for RFID tags to protect against Electronic Product Key sniffing.
Some other works suggest new mechanisms to implement security for IoTs
[Badra and Zeadally 2014, Yan et al. 2017]. For example, [Yang et al. 2017] proposes a
Gaussian-mixture model-based detection scheme to mitigate the data integrity attacks.
[Hu and Gharavi 2014] propose a new solution based on Merkle-tree based handshak-
ing scheme, while [Saxena et al. 2016] proposes a new authentication and authorisation
scheme. Some other research focus on security attacks, such as Denial of Service (DoS)
attack [Liu et al. 2013], Man-In-The-Middle attack [Liu et al. 2015] and data integrity
attacks [Giani et al. 2013].
High level security solutions
Some studies have opted to address the security issues of IICS with a more high level
way by focusing on one or more security aspects over an entire system or subsystem
trying to propose new architectures, new methods and new frameworks instead of tar-
geting low level issues and solving specific technical problems in very specific contexts
such as securing a protocol, protecting against a type of attack or adding a security
feature to some device type. As far as we are concerned, our research works belong to
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this type of studies. They consist of proposing new models and mechanisms to improve
IICS security.
As examples of this type of research findings, [Sani et al. 2019] proposes a cyber-
security framework for IoT-based Energy systems which includes an identity-based
security mechanism, a secure communication protocol and an intelligent security
system for energy management in order to ensure a suitable level of security.
In [Vegh and Miclea 2014], a method of designing a secure cyber-physical system
model by combining both cryptography and steganography is proposed. A trust-
based approach to create a reliable and secure ICS is proposed in [Saqib et al. 2015].
[Xie and Wang 2014] presents a mutual trust model for inter-system security based on
an item-level access-control framework. [Wang et al. 2010] proposes a context-aware
security framework for ICS.
Security guides and standards such as such as NIST [Keith Stouffer and Hahn 2015]
ISA [ISA 2013, ISA 2001, ISA 2004, ISA 1999] and ANSSI [ANSSI 2013,
of France 2013] guides also address high level security topics and propose mul-
tiple frameworks and methodologies. They often recommend to combine multiple
generic security measures such as authentication and authorization mechanisms, secure
protocols, monitoring and logging mechanisms, single point of failure and redundancy
techniques [Keith Stouffer and Hahn 2015, Force and Initiative 2013]. They always
propose generic security architectures that can be used to strengthen Integrated ICS
systems. Defense-in-Depth is one of the their most important recommendations. It is
an architectural security technique that consists of implementing multiple layers of
defense to protect against security issues [CSSP 2009]. It is implemented by dividing
the IICS system into multiple encapsulated security zones to create multiple layers of
defense. Defense-in-depth leverages best practices by making use of firewalls, routers
with Access Control Lists (ACLs), configured switches, routing configuration and
dedicated communications media.
Defense-in-depth is mainly implemented using segmentation and segregation. Seg-
mentation consists of segmenting a system into multiple security zones that can be
separately controlled, monitored and protected [WUL 2016]. A security zone (or secu-
rity segment) is a set of components or sub-systems connected within one sub-network
governed by a single authority and one security policy [Mahan et al. 2011]. Any zone
can be divided into sub-zones when required for some organizational, technical or se-
curity reasons [Jens-Tobias ZERBST 2009]. The security zones must be created with
clearly defined boundaries and policy. Components within them must be governed by
the same policy [Mahan et al. 2011] and communication between zones must be filtered
in accordance with their policies. Segmenting the IICS system into multiple security
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zones really assists organizations in creating clear boundaries in order to effectively
apply multiple layers of defense to protect against malicious and accidental actions
[CSSP 2009]. In general, the system should be closed-looped or air-gapped, and connect
the ICS network to Internet only if necessary [Larkin et al. 2014b]. However, researches
state that many ICS networks are connected to the Internet, sometimes without the
system owner’s approval [Leverett 2011]. When connecting the ICS systems to Internet
is really needed, defense-in-depth through segmentation and segregation is required.
Unfortunately, we could not find enough details on how to efficiently implement
segmentation and segregation in an IICS context. There are still several questions
that remain unanswered [CSSP 2009, Keith Stouffer and Hahn 2015]. First, no precise
explanation was given on how to partition IICS networks into segments. Should the
segmentation be based on the components’ physical characteristics, on their functions
or on their geographical localization? In addition, although segregation rule-sets defi-
nition is not trivial, no sufficient explanation was provided.
We believe that IICS segmentation and segregation are major IICS security topics
that need more study. This is why, for our research works, we mainly focused on these
two techniques trying to create new models and mechanisms that appropriately meet
the actual security needs of integrated ICS systems. A more deep state of the art study
of segregation and segmentation will be provided in the next sections.
3.4 IICS segmentation
3.4.1 Problem statement
IICS are heavily functionally and technically heterogeneous. The segmentation of an
IICS may be based on various types of characteristics such as functional character-
istics, business impact, risk levels, or other requirements defined by the organization.
Although many research works [CSSP 2009, WUL 2016] have suggested some zoning so-
lutions, but these solutions are unfortunately not generic enough and do not sufficiently
take into account all of the IICS specificities such as their heterogeneous technical and
functional nature. Besides, the system’s aspects that should be considered for segmen-
tation are not obvious. Should the segmentation be based on the Components physical
characteristics, their functions or their geographical location? Should we combine more
than one characteristic type to achieve segmentation? There is unfortunately currently
no method that straightforwardly drives this operation to get accurate results.
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Moreover, engineering expertise is not enough to perform IICS segmentation be-
cause it may be error-prone and produce inaccurate results. The work may take more
time than necessary while some important aspects may be neglected. Using a frame-
work or a working method is always very useful because it guarantees more valuable
results more quickly. Although some segmentation solutions have been suggested by
some research works [CSSP 2009, WUL 2016], they still are not generic enough. Inte-
grated ICS systems really need a new generic segmentation method that fills all these
gaps. This would be a valuable contribution on which we decided to work.
3.4.2 Existing segmentation methods and models
Multiple research works have studied IICS systems segmentation. They can be clas-
sified into three categories regarding the approach they take to deal with the segmen-
tation issues as well as the aspects they take into account.
General Security Guides
The first category of the studied documents mainly includes general security guides
such as NIST [Keith Stouffer and Hahn 2015] and ISA [ISA 2013, ISA 2001, ISA 2004,
ISA 1999] guides and also ANSSI [ANSSI 2013, of France 2013]. They are very valu-
able resources for initiation to the subject as they present the concepts and provide the
needed definitions in a fairly simple way. They all agree that implementing segmenta-
tion should be done on a case by case basis based on a risk assessment of the system
[Ralston et al. 2007].
To perform IICS segmentation, the first step is to divide the system into proper secu-
rity zones with clearly defined boundaries and policy. A security zone must have a well-
specified boundary, and communication between zones must be filtered in accordance
with their policies. The segmentation should be based on functional characteristics,
business impact, risk levels, or other requirements defined by the organization.
Direct connection of ICS system to either the Corporate IT system or the Internet
can expose the ICS system to additional threats. Therefore, it’s necessary to separate
the two systems. A new neutral security zone that is in its own DMZ (De-Militarized
Zone) should be created [Pollet 2006] as illustrated in Figure 3.4. A demilitarized zone
(or DMZ) is a separate security zone that contains components that communicate with
“untrusted” networks. This new neutral DMZ will create a security stage between the
corporate IT network and the ICS system.
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Figure 3.4 – General security guides segmentation
The main benefit of this new zone is that exchanges between the Corporate system
and the ICS system can be staged. It avoids multiple direct connections from Corporate
system to the ICS system [Pollet 2006]. This DMZ can also be used as a relay zone
that can securely forward on mandatory flows from the Corporate side to ICS side such
as operating systems and antivirus update patches. Two firewalls are used to protect
this DMZ zone. The first firewall inspects traffic into and out of the DMZ to protect
against security threats destined to the ICS system. The second firewall protect against
security problems originated inside the ICS network [Obregon 2015].
Components within the ICS network such as SCADA server, HMI, PLCs and RTUs
that control the industrial processes should be in a separate security zone in order to
mitigate the risks and prohibit industrial and corporate interference and unauthorized
communication [Pires and Oliveira 2006].
Further considerations should be taken into account to properly perform IICS seg-
mentation:
• No direct connections should exist between the Internet and the ICS network.
• Access from the enterprise network to the control network must be restricted.
• If a component’s criticality is high within a security zone, it is recommended to
enforce this zone’s protection.
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• ICS industrial protocols should be filtered using industrial firewalls. Unfor-
tunately, there are not many choices out there. Tofino Firewall [Tof 2014,
Cereia et al. 2014a] and StormShield SNI40 [Sto ] are some of the few existing
solutions.
• Using two firewalls from different vendors at a zone boundary instead of only one
firewall is an excellent technique. The two vendor firewalls should match in rules
set and configuration [CSSP 2009, Pires and Oliveira 2006].
• A firewall should be added between any wireless network and the network it con-
nects to [CSSP 2009].
To summarize, security guides firmly recommend at least three defense layers as
illustrated in Figure 3.4:
- A first layer where the system’s boundaries are protected by segregating exchanges
with external systems.
- A second layer where the Industrial Control System and the Corporate system
should be logically separated into two security zones.
- Finally, the components that need to communicate from these two security zones,
should be connected through a demilitarized zone. A demilitarized zone (or DMZ)
is a separate security zone that contains components that communicate with “un-
trusted” networks. They should be used to create a security stage between the
corporate IT network and the ICS system.
Furthermore, they notably underline the constraints and issues related to segmenta-
tion such as the possible additional delay engendered by controlling the system com-
munications, as well as, the technical experience needed to correctly implement this
security measure.
Nonetheless, these documents recommendations remain quite shallow because most
of the work must be done on a case by case basis while no precise information is
provided on how to proceed. Many questions remain without answers, especially when
it comes to the aspects that should be taken into account to achieve segmentation.
3.4. IICS SEGMENTATION 37
Example Based Solution
The second category of documents [CSSP 2009] deals the subject with a more con-
crete approach since they implement their solutions using a well defined reference ar-
chitecture. They suggest to implement multiple layers of defense by creating multiple
security zones. They mainly suggest to use the Purdue Model for control hierarchy
logical framework (Figure 3.5), developed by the International Society of Automation
ISA-99 [ISA 2013] that we presented earlier.
Figure 3.5 – Functional Hierarchical model [ISA 2013].
The five functional levels are used, by this second category of documents, as the
primary criterion for security zones delimitation. In other words, according to these
studies, IICS systems should be segmented, at least, into five security zones that cor-
respond to the ISA95 five functional levels with some DMZs especially between ICS
and Corporate system.
The approach of these research works is rather precise, however it has two drawbacks:
• Basing the segmentation solution on a settled reference architecture makes the
solution rigid and inappropriate for a large number of ICS systems. The solution
can, thus, only be adopted for systems similar to the reference system or, at best,
for learning.
• The suggested solutions restrain themselves to the ISA95 functional model which
is usually not really enough to model the IICS system.
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Generic segmentation solutions
The third category of studied research works try to solve the problem in a more
generic way. This category’s solutions, while still based on the ISA95 hierarchical model,
are in the form of generic rules and guidance where security zones are abstractly defined.
We believe that this approach can lead to great results if conducted with deep focus
on the aspects that are really relevant for IICS segmentation. This is an important
ingredient that these research works do not unfortunately ensure because:
• Only the functional aspect, via the ISA95 model, is taken into account. This is
definitely not enough to cover most of the IICS systems.
• IICS (technical, functional ...) constraints highlighted by the first category of stud-
ies, are not taken into account by the proposed models.
3.4.3 Discussion
The studied solutions suggest to create more than one layer of defense and separate
the ICS system from Corporate system. They all make use of DMZs to stage commu-
nication between the different security zones, but do not explain when creating a DMZ
becomes necessary. Most of them agree on the usefulness of the ISA95 model, but do
not take into account other types of characteristics of IICS systems elements that may
be very significant for segmentation. Finally, none of the studied solutions models the
IICS systems real conditions and constraints that may impact security zones. There-
fore, we set up about designing a new generic IICS segmentation method to fill these
gaps. It will be presented, in detail, in the coming sections.
3.5 IICS segregation
The goal of networks segregation is to minimize access to sensitive information for
systems and people who do not need it, while ensuring that the organization can con-
tinue to operate effectively. Therefore, granular network traffic inspection and access
control is necessary to properly secure the conduits. This can be achieved using network
segregation techniques that control communications through the segments’ boundaries
based on a predefined rules set. Rules are typically based on source and destination
identity and the type or content of the data being transferred. This is essentially per-
formed using firewalls.
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Segregation should be implemented by respecting general best segregation practices.
The most important one is the “least privilege principle” [Obregon 2015]. This principle
dictates that a component, a system or a person that needs to communicate through
a zone boundary should be only able to access the information or resources that are
strictly necessary for its legitimate purpose. This implies that the base rule should be
“DENY ALL, PERMIT NONE”. Permissions should only be on demand respecting
a well defined procedure for granting permissions. For example, permission requests
for each incoming or outgoing data flow should be recorded and validated only by
authorised persons. All “PERMIT” rules should be both IP address and TCP/UDP
port specific. The rules should consider both directions through the firewall. Besides,
any communication between two zones must be filtered in accordance with policy.
Services, protocols, and applications that are not necessary inside a zone must be dis-
abled. Any boundary-crossing traffic carrying those services, protocols, or applications
should be blocked at the boundary. For example, industrial traffic that involves only
ICS components should only be allowed within the ICS network. Accordingly, MOD-
BUS/TCP [Huitsing et al. 2008] and DNP3[Fovino et al. 2010] are examples of proto-
cols that should not cross neither the integration layer nor the edges of the system.
If an exchange is allowed between the control network and the DMZ, then it should
explicitly not be allowed between the DMZ and corporate network. Similarly, traffic
that concerns only corporate components must not reach the ICS network. If this is
not possible, compensating measures have then to be taken to protect the networks
against attacks and misuse from outside the ICS.
While conventional segregation solutions could work in some IICS contexts, they
are not always fully compatible with IICS. In fact, ICS systems usually are very de-
manding in terms of timing requirements while conventional firewalls may introduce
significant latency. For example, firewalls are generally deployed on the boundaries of
the security zones to control all outgoing and incoming flows which creates a signifi-
cant load. The Deep inspection mechanism introduces a processing time that, however
negligible it may be, becomes, by a mass effect, significant enough to challenge the use
of firewalls in a context with very high timing requirements such as industrial systems
[Cheminod et al. 2016, Zvabva et al. 2018, Parra et al. 2019, Li et al. 2018]. IDS/IPS
and authentication mechanisms could also have the same side effect on industrial flows.
Segregation inside ICS may thus constitute an angle of denial-of-service attack if its
timing impact is not taken into account. Besides, many of the existing access control
commercial solutions such as firewalls, IDS and authentication mechanisms do not fully
support industrial protocols [Cereia et al. 2014b, Cereia et al. 2014a, Li et al. 2018] or,
for the best, support only some industrial protocols such as ModBus and DNP3
([Tof 2014]).
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Many research studies have been carried out to address the issue of flows segregation
and access control in industrial systems. The proposed solutions are diverse and usu-
ally strongly focus on the timing and infrastructural constraints of industrial systems.
Proposed solutions include new access control mechanisms, new industrial firewalls and
secure protocols.
3.5.1 Industrial access control solutions
Some commercial products such as SEL 3620 [Laboratories b] and SEL 3021
[Laboratories a] from Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories ensure some level of secu-
rity for industrial equipment. The SEL 3620 is a secure Ethernet gateway that handles
Ethernet and serial communications. The SEL 3620 secures all the field communication
with link level encryption using IPsec while providing access control capabilities. There
have also been some efforts for applying RBAC to industrial systems. [Rosic et al. 2013,
Wang et al. 2008, Wei et al. 2013, Wei et al. 2011, Nagarajan and Jensen 2010] pro-
pose different RBAC models for ICS systems.
3.5.2 New industrial secure protocols
Many important protocols used in the industrial world, such as OPC/D-
COM [Galloway and Hancke 2013], Industrial Ethernet/IP, and MODBUS/TCP,
and sometimes HTTP and FTP, have significant security vulnerabilities
[Keith Stouffer and Hahn 2015]. As a general rule, insecure protocols (e.g.,
HTTP, Telnet, FTP) should be replaced by their secure equivalent (e.g.,
HTTPS, SSH, SFTP) to ensure integrity, confidentiality and authenticity
[ANSSI 2013, Keith Stouffer and Hahn 2015]. For protocols that cannot be secured
for technical or operational reasons, compensatory measures should be implemented
[Keith Stouffer and Hahn 2015]. Insecure protocols that cross the integration layer
between ICS and Corporate system should be encapsulated in VPNs such as IPsec
VPNs.
Some research works propose to use crypto-enabled SCADA protocols with authen-
tication and encryption features to secure communication between industrial devices
while ensuring inherent access control. [Shahzad et al. 2015] proposes a new security
design that uses cryptography for MODBUS protocol. [Hayes and El-Khatib 2013] pro-
poses a new Modbus alternative called ModbusSec that uses stream control trans-
mission protocol and hash-based message authentication to ensure availability and
integrity of Modbus messages while providing mutual authentication mechanism.
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[Gilchrist 2008] presents a security mechanism called secure authentication for DNP3
protocol. [Majdalawieh et al. 2006] proposes DNP3Sec.
Protocol based solutions pay considerable attention to industrial performance re-
quirements but are very specific and do not cover all protocols leaving unprotected a
large number of communications in multiple systems.
3.5.3 Industrial firewalls
Firewalls are very important to control communication across different networks espe-
cially between external and internal networks and ICS and Corporate systems. To the
best of our knowledge, there is unfortunately no firewall fully adapted for all indus-
trial systems configurations [CSSP 2009, Keith Stouffer and Hahn 2015]. Most of ex-
isting firewalls only support protocols commonly used in Corporate systems especially
TCP/IP and, for the best, some industrial protocols such as ModBus and DNP3 (see
Tofino Industrial Security Solution [Tof 2014, Cereia et al. 2014b, Cereia et al. 2014a].
IICS systems really need industrial firewalls that can be used with different industrial
systems configurations (distributed, located, wired, wireless...) taking into account in-
dustrial technologies and protocols and more importantly industrial timing require-
ments.
Besides the commercial industrial firewalls such as Modbus DPI (Deep Packet In-
spection) Firewall from Tofino [Tof 2015], SCADA Firewall from Bayshore Network,
and Eagle mGuard from Innominate [inn 2015], some studies propose new firewalls to
address the problem of inspection of industrial protocols. [Nivethan and Papa 2016]
proposes to use Linux Iptables. [Hachana et al. 2016] shows through experimental
study how conventional firewalls can be tuned to fit ICS requirements using stateful
filtering. [Salah et al. 2012] proposes a simple Markov model to describe the behavior
of an iptables-based software firewall for industrial access control. Unfortunately, the
proposed firewalls do not consider how the deep packet inspection can impact latency.
Some other research works propose very specific firewall solutions.
[Khosroshahi and Shahinzadeh 2016] introduces a firewall system for the energy
sector focusing on the Distributed Network Protocol 3 (DNP3). Their implementation
is based on the iptables firewall. [H. Eslava and Pineda 2015] presents a firewall
system for IEC 61850 protocol. [W. Shang and Zeng 2016] introduces a novel firewall
system for Modbus protocol. [Diovu and Agee 2017, Diovu and Agee 2017] propose
new firewalls designed specifically for smart grid systems. The results of these studies
are interesting but are unfortunately only applicable in their specific context.
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[Li et al. 2018] proposes a new firewall model to increase the efficiency of controls
in terms of resource consumption by using Comprehensive Packet Inspection (CPI) to
inspect packets more deeply and efficiently. Their solution, however, lacks extensibility.
[Force and Initiative 2013, ISA 2013, CSSP 2009] give some guidelines, but their
recommendations should be put into practice to evaluate their efficiency to answer to
the request “How can we use firewalls with different industrial systems (distributed,
located) taking into account industrial technologies and protocols?”
Industrial IDS/IPS
IDS/IPS are also common solution to implement flows access control. Unfortunately,
there is no commercial IDS/IPS solution that is fully adapted to IICS systems. This
is because existing IDS/IPS commercial solutions do not support most of the indus-
trial protocols, and are not designed to respect ICS requirements. Besides, no pre-
cision is given on where to place IDS within an ICS system. Campbell and Rrushi
[Campbell and Rrushi 2011] present research on an anomaly detection model for nu-
clear power plants. The methodology consists in examining the detection of a po-
tential attack that attempts to send faulty data from a field device to the HMI.
The work demonstrates that it is possible to extend anomaly detection models to
the ICS environment [Larkin et al. 2014a]. However, without developing custom so-
lutions, current IDS solutions also work poorly in a ICS environments as stated
by [Verba and Milvich 2008, Larkin et al. 2014a]. [D’Antonio et al. 2006] developed a
new IDS for ICS systems to detect real time intrusion by extracting user behavior
from the network traffic and comparing it to a set of predefined behavior model.
[Rrushi and Campbell 2008] created a model to identify anomalies based on MOD-
BUS payload data units (PDU). [Düssel et al. 2010] propose a protocol independent
IDS using n-grams that takes the similarity of the communication layer messages. Re-
cently, [Yun et al. 2018] proposed an IDS that uses a nearest neighbor approach to
learn patterns of normal activities and identify anomalies. Similarly, [Lin et al. 2017]
proposed a machine learning-based scheme to develop an IDS which learn normal be-
havior patterns to be able to detect unwanted intrusion events.
While IDS/IPS can be used to detect abnormal flows and prevent them, they are not
always as deterministic as it could be needed. Besides, most of the proposed solutions
need significant effort to model normal behaviours for non supported protocols or for
specific systems.
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3.5.4 DTE
[Bradetich and Oman 2007] investigated the use of DTE techniques on IICS systems.
Although their findings are interesting, they are limited to securing flows between ICS
and Corporate system. Interested in developing new generic models and mechanisms
for IICS security, we believe that such a technique can be transformed into a generic
model that can be applied to different IICS systems. Our objective is to generalize
DTE controls to the whole system by providing a generic model that provides simple
and consistent concepts that allow control rules to be defined in a straightforward and
homogeneous way across the system, but with more focus on ICS systems. Our study
will be presented in chapter 6.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter provides a summarized overview of ICS security problems, the inte-
gration challenges and an analysis of countermeasures evaluating their maturity for
Integrated ICS systems. A lot of work has been done on IICS security. Multiple vul-
nerabilities have been identified and a lot of countermeasures have been proposed.
However, ICS and Corporate systems integration remains very challenging from a se-
curity standpoint. Most of the existing IICS security measures are borrowed from the
IT world and are not redesigned to take into account industrial system specificities.
We argue that there are still many security topics that need more work to complete
the existing solutions panel in order to secure IICS more efficiently. This is especially
the case for segmentation and segregation, where authentication and authorization
mechanisms, firewalls and IDS/IPS still need adaptation for industrial systems.
We decided to work on the problem of segmentation and segregation of IICS. The
results of our work will be detailed in the next chapters.

CHAPTER
4 SONICS segmentation
method
4.1 Introduction
Integrated ICS segmentation is not easy because they are heavily heterogeneous.
Characteristics on which security zones identification should be based may include
functional characteristics, business impact, risk levels, or other requirements defined
by the organization, but they remain complex and ambiguous. Besides, performing
segmentation in large-scale networks taking into account architecture changes and con-
figuration updates is another difficulty with Integrated ICS segmentation. Engineering
expertise are not enough to perform segmentation because it may be error-prone and
produce inaccurate results. The work may take more time than necessary while some
important aspects may be neglected. Using a framework or a working method is always
very useful because it guarantees more accurate results more quickly. Unfortunately,
there is currently no method that straightforwardly drives this operation.
As explained in chapter 3, several research works have studied IICS segmentation.
For most of them (NIST [Keith Stouffer and Hahn 2015], ISA [ISA 2013, ISA 2004,
ISA 1999] and ANSSI [of France 2013] guides ...), segmentation should be done on
a case by case basis. However, they do not provide sufficient guidance. Some others
[CSSP 2009] have an example oriented approach and try to perform segmentation on
a well defined reference architecture. They recommend adopting the Purdue Model for
Control Hierarchy logical framework (IEC 62264) [ISA 2013] to delineate the security
zones.
Few research [CSSP 2009, WUL 2016] works propose a generic solution to the prob-
lem. They provide generic rules and guidance to identify security zones while still
adopting the IEC 62264 (ISA95) hierarchical model. We believe that this approach
can lead to great results if conducted with deep focus on aspects that are relevant for
IICS segmentation. Therefore, we propose SONICS, a new generic IICS segmentation
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method that aims at simplifying IICS security zones identification by focusing on rele-
vant aspects and taking industrial specificity into account. This method uses a simple
meta-model to describe IICS systems and allows to identify potential security zones
throughout multiple steps. The new identified potential zones are kept or not based on
a constraints analysis.
In the next sections, we present SONICS, our new IICS segmentation method. We
explain the method’s meta-model (4.2.2), the system’s constraints taken into account by
SONICS (4.2.3) and the potential zones identification the constraints analysis process
(4.2.4). Next, we present our test plan for validating the method. We will explain the
test methodology and present the results we obtained. The latest section discusses the
tests results as well as possible improvements.
4.2 SONICS: the IICS segmentation method
4.2.1 The principle
Figure 4.1 – The Segmentation method
With SONICS, the segmentation is done in two phases as illustrated in Figure
4.1. The first phase consists of modeling the system to be segmented using the meta-
model (Figure 4.2) presented in 4.2.2. The system’s model is the main input of the
second phase. The later consists of segmenting the system through six cycles. At the
first cycle, the system’s boundaries are protected. This is the first security zone of the
system. Next the system’s Components are grouped cycle after cycle based on only one
aspect (Functional, Technical, Geographical, Processes, and Inter-Zones Connections
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Risk) per cycle to constitute potential security zones.[Khaoula et al. 2017] More details
about Components grouping are provided in the next sections. The identified security
zones at each cycle, are kept according to a constraints analysis conducted on the
Components involved in the new identified zones. Constraints analysis is explained in
section 4.2.3.
Figure 4.2 – IICS Meta-Model
4.2.2 The IICS Meta-Model
Our IICS meta-model (Figure 4.2) allows to model an IICS as a set of “Components”,
“Connections” and “Processes”.
Components
A Component is any device capable of communicating through the network of the
system regardless its functions and technologies. A Component is characterized by its
functional level, its technical type and the geographical site to which it belongs.
• Functional levels
Components can be grouped according to their function in the system
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[ISA 2001, Obregon 2015]. We use an extended model of the IEC 62264
functional hierarchical model (ISA 95) that defines the different functional
levels within IICS (see Table 4.1). Each component of the system belongs
to only one functional group. Segmentation based on this aspect is recom-
mended by multiple research studies [CSSP 2009, WUL 2016, ISA 2013] because
Components with different functions usually have different security characteristics.
Table 4.1 – Functional Levels
Group Name Definition
FL-0 Process
This level includes sensors and actuators directly
connected to the production process
FL-1
Local or
Basic Control
It includes the functions involved in collecting
data and manipulating the physical processes
FL-2
Supervisory
Control
It includes the functions involved in monitoring
and controlling the physical process
FL-3
Operations
Management
This level includes the functions involved in
managing and optimizing the production work
flows
FL-4
Enterprise
Business
Systems
It includes the functions involved in the
business-related activities
FL-ST Support
It includes Components that do not belong to any
of the other levels
• Technical Types
The technical nature of the Components is another key aspect to con-
sider for segmentation. There are many security guides and standards
[Keith Stouffer and Hahn 2015, ISA 2013, ISA 2004, ISA 1999, of France 2013,
Jens-Tobias ZERBST 2009] that state that components of different technical
nature must be separated into different security zones because they have different
security requirements (see Table 4.2). A Component can be an Information
Technology (IT), Operation Technology (OT) Component[IOT 2014].
IT Components
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– Are “Enterprise data centric”: Cover the spectrum of systems that support
corporate functions;
– Focus on higher level processes and transactions that manipulate data;
– Focus on data confidentiality and integrity.
– The main humans role is manipulating (reading, creating and updating) the
data.
OT Components
– Are “Thing (product) centric”: Deal with the physical transformation of prod-
ucts and services;
– Focus on physical industrial processes. They are mission-critical task-specific
systems where controlling the physical equipment should be done with great
precision;
– Focus on safety and availability.
– The main humans role is supervising and controlling the industrial processes.
A Component can, otherwise, be an IT-OT Component. We introduced this
new type to distinguish Components that are designed to use both types of
technologies IT and OT such as workstations.
Table 4.2 – Technical Types
Group Definition
OT Operational Technology Component
IT Information Technology Component
IT-OT
Components that are designed to use both
types of technologies (IT/OT)
• Geographical location
Components’ geographical location is also relevant for segmentation
[Keith Stouffer and Hahn 2015]. Two physically distant sites systematically
constitute two different security zones. “Physically distant” sites are sites that
are either connected by wireless Connection or non physically protected wired
Connection.
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Processes
Segmentation should also take into account the organisational aspects of the organ-
isation. This can be achieved with system business and industrial processes.
A “Process” is a set of interrelated interacting activities that transform inputs into
outputs. A system is organized into multiple business and industrial processes. Each
component belongs to one or more processes. Process identification should be done
by the company. In general, an organizational standard such as ISO9001 is applied to
organize the system into processes.
Each process is characterized by its “required protection level” and represents a
potential security zone. The “required protection level” of a process can have one of
the following values:
- Level A: Ultimate protection level
- Level B: High protection level
- Level C: Medium protection level
- Level D: Weak protection level
The level of protection required depends on the risk level of the process and should be
evaluated based on a risk analysis. We propose a simple risk analysis method based
on EBIOS [de la Défense Nationale 2010] and adapted to the specificity of IICS. The
risk level is a function of the gravity of the feared events and their likelihood. It can
be evaluated as follows:
1. Identify the feared events and estimate their gravity: Feared events gravity
is the extent of their impact on one or more of the organization’s assets. It can have
one of the gravity scale values from Table 4.3. Estimating the gravity is performed
through a qualitative approach that requires a good knowledge of the system and
the organization’s activity. It should therefore be done in collaboration with the
organization’s staff. In case a feared event has more than one gravity level from
the Table (for example, significant gravity in terms of security aspects but critical
financial loss), the worst case is assumed.
2. Analyze Threat Sources and estimate the likelihood of the attack: There
is one threat source that can affect an IICS process security: the compromise of
one of its components or a component that is connected to it. In this case, the
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Table 4.3 – The gravity scale
Safety: No threat to safety
Regulatory/Legal: Internal sanction at the most
Company’s image: No impact
Financial: Low potential financial low (e.g., few
dozens of dollars)
1. Low
Business: Loss of some few prospects
Safety: Small material damage
Regulatory/Legal: Small Contractual penalties with
some small clients
Company’s image: Local impact, limited number of
actors
Financial: e.g., some thousands of dollars
2. Considerable
Business: Loss of small clients
Safety: Considerable material damage
Regulatory/Legal: Strong contractual penalties with
major clients, civil or criminal cases, non-compliance
with law or regulation
Company’s image: Wide perimeter impact
Financial: Dozens of thousands of dollars annually
3. Critical
Business: Loss of important clients
Safety: Big material damage, Danger on Human safety
Regulatory/Legal: Major non-compliance with the
law or regulation, massive invasion of privacy, criminal
conviction, contractual penalties with multiple actors.
Company’s image: Scandal
Financial: Hundreds of thousands of dollars annually
4. Major
Business: Loss of partnership, Massive loss of clients
whole process can be compromised. The likelihood of such an attack should be
estimated using the qualitative scale presented in Table 4.4, taking into account
the system’s technical and organizational context, the attack’s difficulty as well as
the existing solutions.
3. Evaluate the risk level: The risk level associated to the process is calculated
based on the related gravity and the likelihood of the attack. The risk levels grid
in Figure 4.3 assists in calculating it.
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Table 4.4 – The likelihood scale
Liklihood Definition
1. Low This is unlikely to happen
2. Probable This may happen
3. Significant
There is a significant risk that this will
occur
4. Strong This should happen one day
Table 4.5 – Risk level / Required protection level
Risk level Required protection level
Extreme risk Level A (Ultimate)
Critical risk Level B (High)
Considerable risk Level C (Medium)
Negligible risk Level D (Low)
Figure 4.3 – Risk levels grid
The required protection level of a process is proportional to its risk level. Table 4.5
presents how risk levels match “required protection levels”.
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Connections
A “Connection” is any channel that can be used by two (or more) Components to
communicate with each others. It can be physical, where the Components are directly
linked by a physical (wired or a wireless) connection, or logical, where the Components
are linked through a succession of physical Connections. A Connection may be charac-
terized by its risk level. Connections impact segmentation especially when they connect
Components from different zones. This is why we pay special attention to inter-zones
Connections. These connections emerge at the end of each cycle of the segmentation
method, as we progressively create new security zones. Therefore, they can only be
modeled when all the Components security zones are identified.
Inter-zones Connections may connect security zones that have different security
levels or contain Components of different risk levels. This can introduce security is-
sues. Therefore, these zones should be protected by introducing a new security zone
[Obregon 2015] that stages and secure communication through their boundaries.
For example, when connecting two Components X and Y from two different zones
A and B, where the risk on the zone A is high while the security level on the zone B is
low, it is necessary to protect zone A against potential issues lead by this Connection
(see Figure 4.4). This can be done by introducing a new security zone that stages
communications between the two zones A and B.
Figure 4.4 – Inter-zone connection’s security zone
The risk level of each inter-zone connection of the system should be evaluated based
on a risk analysis of the Connections and Components they connect. We use the same
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risk analysis method presented in section 4.2.2. For a given inter-zone connection, all
the Services exposed by the Components of the zones it connects as well as all the
manipulated Data should be analyzed in order to perform a more accurate qualitative
assessment of the risk associated to these components.
Note that each inter-zone connection is bidirectional. This implies that the risk
analysis should be performed on the two interconnected zones components.
4.2.3 IICS Segmentation Constraints
The addition of a new security zone can sometimes be subject to difficulties related to
the state of the system or its specific requirements. Our segmentation method takes
this into account by requiring a constraints analysis at the end of each cycle. The
constraints analysis helps to decide whether the identified zones are to be retained or
not. There are two generic types of IICS constraints that we focus on:
Functional Constraints
Introducing a new security zone must not adversely affect the expected functioning of
the system. Functional requirements that may be sensitive to segmentation should be
identified and studied on a case-by-case basis. For example, special attention should be
paid to the timing requirements of the critical components of the IICS to ensure that
they will not be affected by the flows filtering across security zones boundaries. This
task will have to be taken care of by the security administrators.
Functional constraints are not all on the same level of importance. Therefore, we
defined three Constraints Levels:
- Constraint Level A: Some mandatory requirements can not be satisfied if the
new boundary is created. A mandatory requirement is a requirement that can not
be dropped out. For example: in a very critical industrial infrastructure, timing
requirements of the communication between a PLC and the physical process it
controls can be so strict that the response time must not be beyond some mil-
liseconds. This is a mandatory requirement that should not be impacted by the
creation of a new security zone. When such a requirement can not be respected,
the constraint level is then at Level A.
- Constraint Level B: Some important requirements can not be satisfied if the
new boundary is created. An important requirement is a requirement that can
hardly be dropped out.
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- Constraint Level C: Some optional requirements can not be satisfied if the
new boundary is created. An optional requirement is a requirement that should
preferably be satisfied but can be dropped out.
The system administrators have to do a qualitative evaluation of the constraint’s
level of all the constraints he/she identifies in the system.
Technical Constraints
Creating new security zones and filtering communication through their boundaries
can sometimes be very difficult when the system’s technologies (protocols, servers,
techniques...) lack adapted zoning and filtering (firewalls, IDS,...) security solutions.
This is a common issue of industrial systems where legacy and proprietary industrial
technologies continue to exist whereas no segmentation product support them. It is
all a matter of cost. Theoretically, it is always possible to build custom solutions on
demand to meet the specific needs. However, cost can be so high that the return on
investment is not interesting. In such a case, adding a new security boundary is simply
not worth it. Technical constraints can have one of the following Constraint Levels:
- Constraint Level A: Adding the new security boundary has a Very High Cost.
- Constraint Level B: Adding the new security boundary has a High Cost.
- Constraint Level C: Adding the new security boundary has a Medium Cost.
4.2.4 Selecting the potential zones to keep
The potential security zones that are progressively identified are kept or not based
on a constraints analysis performed on those new zones. Retaining a new identified
potential zone is a decision to make by comparing the Necessity of this new zone
to the Constraint level of its elements. We defined, therefore, a Grading System
that helps to evaluate the Necessity of adding a new zone, evaluate the Constraint’s
Level of its elements and compare these two “grades” in order to decide whether or
not to keep the new zone. It is composed of the two Necessity and Constraints scales
(Tables 4.6 and 4.7).
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Table 4.6 – Segmentation Necessity Levels
Necessity Level Definition
Level A Non-Negotiable
Level B Necessary
Level C Mildly Necessary
Level D Optional
Table 4.7 – Constraints Level Scale
Constraint Level Definition
Level A Zoning is inconceivable
Level B Zoning is almost inconceivable
Level C Zoning is conceivable with difficulty
Segmentation Necessity Grading System
The Necessity of a zone represents how important this zone is. This depends on
the cycle (Functional, Technical ...) in which the zone was identified. For example,
functional based zones are not as necessary as geo-location based zones. We therefore
estimated the Necessity associated to each cycle. All the Necessity levels are listed
by Table 4.8. These values were preset based on our knowledge of IICS systems.
Segmentation Constraints Grading System
The level of a given constraint is its impact on the feasibility of adding a new potential
security zone. Each known constraint must be assigned a grade from Table 4.7. The
company has to evaluate the system’s constraint’s impact based on their knowledge
of the technical and functional context of the system. Constraints levels for functional
and technical constraints were presented in sections 4.2.3 and 4.2.3.
Grades Comparison
The ultimate objective of our two grading systems is to compare a new zone’s neces-
sity to its constraints in order to decide if the new zone should be created or rejected.
The comparison should be done as follows: Let us assume that we identified a new
potential zone based on a given meta-characteristic. We will call this zone Zone A for
simplicity. Let us also assume that:
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Table 4.8 – Segmentation Necessity Level Scale
Meta-Characteristic Segmentation Necessity
Functional Grouping Level C
Technical Grouping Level B
Geographical Grouping Level A
Process Grouping
Equals the required protection
level (A, B, C, D)
Inter-zone Staging
Equals the connection risk level
(A, B, C, D)
• Lseg: is the Necessity Level of creating the Zone A.
• Lcs: is the greatest grade of the grades assigned to the constraints that are relevant
for Zone A.
Then:
• if Lseg ≥ Lcs: Creating the new zone is conceivable and it is as necessary as its
necessity level grade is great.
• if Lseg < Lcs: Creating the new zone is inconceivable.
4.2.5 Formalization
The formalization below of the SONICS method using mathematical objects sum-
marizes the method and provides a useful starting point for the implementation.
Preliminary: Let S an IICS system, S = <C,X,P,Ge> where:- C is the set
of components of S, - X is the set of connections of S, where : ∀x ∈ X, ∃
c1, c2 ∈ C where x =< c1, c2 > . - P is the set of processes of S. - Ge is the set
of all the geographical sites of S.
Notations:
• ∀c ∈ C,
– flc ∈ {FL0, FL1, FL2, FL3, FL4, FLST} is the functional level of c.
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– ttc ∈ {TI, TO, TIO} is the technical type of c.
– sitec ∈ Ge is the site to which c belongs.
– procc ⊂ P is the set of processes to which c belongs.
• ∀x ∈ X,
– clx ∈ {LEV EL_A,LEV EL_B,LEV EL_C,LEV EL_D} is the con-
straint level of x.
– riskx ∈ {LEV EL_A,LEV EL_B,LEV EL_C,LEV EL_D, ∅} is the
risk level of x.
Definitions:
1. The function constraints level cl is defined as follows:
cl : X → {LEV EL_A,LEV EL_B,LEV EL_C,LEV EL_D}
x 7→ cl(x) = clx
2. The function risk level risk is defined as follows:
risk : X → {LEV EL_A,LEV EL_B,LEV EL_C,LEV EL_D, ∅}
x 7→ risk(x) = riskx
3. We define the inter-components connection function as:
cx : C × C → X ∪ {∅}
(c, d) 7→ cx(c, d) =
< c, d > : if c and d are connected
when c and d are not connected, cx(c, d) = ∅.
4. Let Σ(S) the set of all possible segmentations of the system S,
Σ(S) = { σ / σ is a partition of C }
σ is a partition of C if:
• ∅ /∈σ
• ⋃A∈σ A = C
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• ∀A,B ∈ σ, A 6= B ⇒A ∩B = ∅
5. For each cycle of the method, we define the cycle’s processor function as:
Prg : Σ(S) → Σ(S)
σ 7→ Prg(σ)
Prg(σ) =
{
A’ ⊂ C/∀c, d ∈ A′,
(∃A ∈ σ where c, d ∈ A and
(
g(c) = g(d)
or
cl(cx(c, d)) > necessityg(c, d)
))
}
where necessityg is the cycle’s necessity function of creating a boundary between
two components, and g is the cycle’s grouping function. The definition of grouping
functions is:
g : C → G
c 7→ g(c)
G is a set of grouping values (such as functional levels, technical types ...). Thus:
• The functional grouping function is:
func : C → {FL0, FL1, FL2, FL3, FL4, FLST}
c 7→ func(c) = flc
• The technical grouping function is:
tech : C → {TI, TO, TIO}
c 7→ tech(c) = ttc
• The geolocation grouping function is:
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geo : C → Ge
c 7→ geo(c) = sitec
• The processes grouping function is:
proc : C → P
c 7→ proc(c) = procc
6. The intern-connection-risk grouping function is:
IZX : Σ(S) → Σ(S)
c 7→ IZX(σ)
IZX(σ) =
{
A’ ⊂ C/∀ c ∈ A′, ∃A,B ∈ σ,∃d ∈ B where :
(
A 6= B and
c ∈ A and
cx(c, d) 6=∅ and
cl(cx(c, d)) ≤ risk(cx(c, d))
)
}
7. We finally define SONICS as:
SONICS(S) : Σ(S) → Σ(S)
σ 7→ IZX ◦ Prproc ◦ Prgeo ◦ Prtech ◦ Prfunc(σ)
Let us assume that σinitial, is the initial segmentation of the system S,
σresult = SONICS(S)(σinitial), is the result of the application of SONICS on the system
S.
4.2.6 SONICS Tool
We have developed a tool that implements our method (Figure 4.5). This tool allows to
create system models and run the segmentation steps on a model to obtain a segmented
system.
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Creating a model using the tool is fairly simple but requires good knowledge and
prior preparation. It is necessary that the tool’s user knows sufficiently well the archi-
tecture of the system, its processes, its risks, and its constraints. The system’s modeling
consists, as depicted in Figure 4.5, of creating components, specifying their character-
istics and adding connections and processes.
Figure 4.5 – SONICS Tool - Modeling step
Once the model is created, the tool allows to roll out the steps of the method one af-
ter another allowing to assign constraint levels to inter-zones connections. For example,
for the first segmentation step, namely functional segmentation, the tools calculates the
cycle’s new potential zones (differentiating them using different colors) as illustrated by
Figure 4.6. It outlines the inter-zones connections of these potential zones allowing to
set their constraints levels (Figure 4.7). The security zones are then recalculated based
on the newly set constraints levels values. The next cycles are processed (by pressing
the "Next Step" button) in a similar way until we get the final result.
Moreover, the tool is completely recursive. Any value set by the user, no matter
whether it is a characteristic of a component, of a connection, or of a process, is
62 CHAPTER 4. SONICS SEGMENTATION METHOD
Figure 4.6 – SONICS Tool - Functional potential zones
Figure 4.7 – SONICS Tool - Constraints levels attribution
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included in the system’s model and reused through the various steps. For example, if
a connection’s constraint level is set during some cycle, is does not need to be reset
at other cycles as it becomes a characteristic of that connection. This ensures that the
segmentation result is automatically recalculated any time the system’s model evolves
by adding, modifying or deleting components, connections or processes.
4.3 Application and Results
4.3.1 Test methodology
SONICS is the result of a rather deep and complex analysis of the segmentation prob-
lem. Our approach to design SONICS is completely based on our understanding of
industrial systems, and the aspects recommended for segmentation by the standards
and research works we have studied. It is very difficult to explain how the different
parts of this method were built because it is the result of a very complex process of
brainstorming, improvement, refinement and reworking that took a long time. This is
not very important in determining the value of our method. The only important thing
is to prove that the results of the method are correct. Most, if not all, paradigms and
methods introduce new theoretical concepts to try to model a problem or phenomenon
without explaining the why and how. They are nonetheless approved when they prove
their accuracy. This is done in perfect respect of the modern scientific experimental
approach.
Therefore, we designed a validation test method in order to evaluate our segmen-
tation method. This test method is based on the comparison of the result of SONICS
to segmentations that are made over time by expertise (without a method) and are
assumed to be accurate. Given a test system with an existing accurate segmentation,
the validation test consists of applying SONICS on this system and comparing the
results with the existing segmentation as explained in Figure 4.8. For more readability,
we will use the term Ex-Segmentation to refer to any “existing accurate segmentation”.
The comparison of SONICS result with an Ex-Segmentation is done using the new
concept of segmentation efficiency and accuracy presented below.
Segmentation efficiency and accuracy
We define the efficiency of a method on a set of test systems as the mean of the
accuracy of the results obtained for each system. A result’s accuracy depends on how
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Figure 4.8 – Test Methodology
much the result is similar to the expected one. In our case, a segmentation’s result’s
accuracy is a function of the distance between the segmentation obtained using SONICS
and the Ex-Segmentation. The distance between two segmentations of a same system
is the minimum cost to transform a segmentation into the other one by performing a
set of only the following actions:
• Move only one component at a time from one segment to another.
• Remove one segment
• Merge two segments
Each action has a cost of 1. For example, the distance between two segmentations, where
it is necessary to move two components of their segments, is equal to 2. Accuracy is
calculated based on the distance using the following formula:
accuracy = 11 + distance
When two segmentations are the same, the distance between them equals 0, the
accuracy then equals 1 (the maximum value). On the other hand, when the distance
increases, the accuracy decreases towards 0.
4.3.2 Test systems
A test system can only be used in our validation test if it incorporates an Ex-
Segmentation that has been verified over time. This allows to validate segmentation
results on real systems with effective segmentation under real conditions and on a long
term basis. However, this approach has the disadvantage of being very expensive and
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inflexible because creating a good test system is time-consuming and finding existing
test systems is not easy.
Figure 4.9 – The IIC test System
We have tested our method on only one test system (Figure 4.9). This is the only
system available to us that fulfills the criteria of test systems selection. It is based on
a real system in production with an Ex-Segmentation. It consists of two geographically
separate sites and includes the following components :
• An ERP / MES - LINA: that manages all the company’s resources.
• A CRM Web server: that manages orders, validates them, and launches industrial
processes.
• MySQL database: that Contains all the business data. It is shared by the CRM
and the ERP-MES.
• SCADA (PCView andWinCC): that controls PLCs, such as loading new programs,
retrieving and displaying information...
• The ICS part of the system consists of two field sites.
1. A main field site where a SCADA network and a set of industrial production
devices are deployed.
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2. A remote secondary field site where a remote production unit is deployed.
For simplicity, we suppose that the system does not have any specific legal, organi-
zational or responsibilities grouping requirements.
The system is segmented into 3 segments as illustrated by the figure. This is the
Ex-Segmentation for our test. It has been made only by skills and security knowledge
but has also proven its effectiveness over time. It is also reliable because the test system
is not very complex.
4.3.3 Results and Discussion
Figure 4.10 – The Segmented IIC test system
The application of our segmentation method on our test system has resulted in the
segmented system illustrated by Figure 4.10.
By comparing the segmentation result with the Ex-Segmentation, the method al-
lowed us to obtain a segmentation rather close to the Ex-Segmentation. The distance
between the two segmentations remains quite small (equal to 3). We noticed that this
distance was mainly due to the division of existing segments into several segments.
This means that the method generated a segmentation that are too restrictive and too
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demanding in terms of securing inter-component flows. This impacted the accuracy but
does not mean that the result is completely incorrect. In fact, two unnecessary security
zones was added introducing a gap with the Ex-Segmentation.
The study of the causes that led to the identification of these additional segments re-
vealed that these segments were useful for flows controls without needing firewalls. That
led us to an important conclusion that all the new identified zones do not necessarily
have to represent a network segment with a firewall. Other segregation techniques may
be used as appropriate to the security characteristics of the identified zone. Incorpo-
rating these segregation techniques into the method would be a possible improvement
to our method. On the other hand, the method takes into account industrial systems
specificities. Nevertheless, we believe that it may also be possible to rely the method a
little more on security characteristics (such as Risk and Security Level).
In general, the first results support our conviction that SONICS is a valuable so-
lution that provides satisfying and realistic answers to an unresolved problem namely
IICS systems segmentation. It is a generic solution that can be applied to different
types of IICS. It supplies efficient guidance and allows to be focused only on aspects
that are significant for segmentation by using a simple meta-model. It considers mul-
tiple aspects in order to ensure that IICS systems heterogeneity is taken into account.
Another advantage of our method is its constraints based zoning decision making.
This makes the method very pragmatic and ensures more accurate results. In addition,
the application of the method remains affordable, especially when using the tool we
developed.
4.4 Conclusion
SONICS is a new IICS segmentation method that aims at ensuring efficient zoning to
meet actual security needs of IICS. It is based on a meta-model that helps to model
systems. System models are used by the method to identify potential security zones.
These are kept or dropped out based on a constraints analysis.
We designed and carried out a validation test to evaluate the method. This helped
us to identify the limitations and difficulties associated with the method and to identify
possible improvements. The first test results were acceptable. However, we admit that
the method’s application is not simple enough without using the tool we developed.
That said, our test method is by itself a standalone scientific contribution that can be
reused or adapted for other scientific works.
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SONICS has a lot of advantages. It is a generic solution that can be applied to differ-
ent types of IICS. It keeps the focus only on aspects that are relevant for segmentation.
It is a fairly pragmatic method that takes into account IICS constraints and specificity.
Note that the method uses industrial systems concepts (Operation functional levels, IT
and OT technical types), but it can be applied to a non integrated Corporate system
(IT) as well as to a non integrated ICS. This should be guaranteed any way by our
method because both systems are subsystems of an integrated ICS.
However, we agree that the method could be improved by taking more security as-
pects (such as Risk and Security Level) into account. The method could also incorporate
more segregation concepts to provide more guidance for inter-zones flows protection
in order to optimize the Segmentation/Segregation cost. These improvements will be
addressed in the next chapters.
CHAPTER
5 RIICS: Risk based IICS
segmentation Method
5.1 Introduction
SONICS method tries to take into account the most important aspects for IICS segmen-
tation according to multiple security standards. Technical and functional specificities
are well covered by the method via components’ characteristics as well as with techni-
cal and functional constraints. This ensures that components of different technical or
functional natures are separated unless there are constraints to do so. The method also
involves separating components that belong to different remote sites in order to comply
with common security recommendations. However, the security aspect of components
is not adequately addressed. Only processes are segmented according to their risks. We
have therefore decided to make more use of the concept of risk in order for our method
to take more security aspects into account. We believe that the concept of components
risk is one of the best ways to characterize components from a security angle. The risk
associated with data, components or processes is based on the probability and gravity
of the applicable attacks. Risk analysis requires a strong focus on the study of the
context, and involves implementation of rational and optimal measures, especially in
terms of cost. For example, it is not necessary to apply very strong and costly measures
to protect against an attack that is unlikely to happen and for which the impact is not
very significant.
On the other hand, SONICS segments according to both functional and techni-
cal characteristics. We realized, after the application of SONICS several times, that
technical groups are actually a subset of functional groups:
• The IT group is equivalent to the FL4 group. All components of the FL4 levels
are also considered as IT components, because they all are data centric.
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• The ITOT group equals the FLST group in most cases. The most common support
components are often ITOT components, and can be used in both IT and OT
contexts.
• The OT group includes all functional groups FL0,1,2,2 and 3. All components of
the FL0,1,2, and 3 groups are OT components because they are process centric.
We therefore initially thought of not using technical segmentation anymore. How-
ever, we also found that functional groups are very often not segmented because of
functional and technical constraints (especially timing requirements and cost). We fi-
nally decided to keep the technical segmentation instead of functional segmentation
because it gives, bearing in mind the constraints, the same results as the technical
segmentation in most cases. We believe the elimination of functional segmentation will
not only have little impact on the accuracy of the results, but it could also improve
them.
Therefore, we propose RIICS (Risk based IICS Segmentation), a new segmentation
method for IICS systems that fills the gaps of SONICS and tries to simplify security
zones identification by focusing on systems technical industrial specificities and risk.
The RIICS method is presented in section 5.3. We explain the principle, the concepts
and the main steps of the method. The next section presents the validation tests, and
discusses the results.
5.2 Risk Analysis applied to IICS
Before we present the method, we have a say on risk assessment for IICS systems. We
used risk analysis for the first time with SONICS, to segment business and industrial
processes. At that stage, the risk is calculated in a fairly ordinary way by following
specific instructions of the EBIOS method. We explored the subject of risk analysis a
little further in order to study more closely the application of a risk analysis method
such as EBIOS in an industrial context. We mainly aimed to verify the applicability
of EBIOS to IICS and possibly propose an extension of the method to make it more
compatible with industrial environments. The results of this study would be of benefit
for the RIICS method to be improved.
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5.2.1 EBIOS Method for IT risk assessment
EBIOS is a French acronym meaning Expression of Needs and Identification of Secu-
rity Objectives (Expression des Besoins et Identification des Objectifs de Sécurité).
It is a method for analysis, evaluation and action on Information Systems risk. The
EBIOS method [de la Défense Nationale 2010] is an IT risk assessment method devel-
oped in 1995 by the Central Directorate for Information Systems Security (DCSSI) and
maintained by the National Agency for Information Systems Security (ANSSI) since
2009.
It is used to assess the security risks of information systems and identify the neces-
sary measures. For EBIOS, risk is a scenario that combines a feared events (a financial
or physical damage for example) and one or more attack.
An EBIOS risk analysis applied to a given system or subsystem is carried out in 5
steps as illustrated in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1 – EBIOS Steps
The Context Study
The goal of this key step is to define the scope of the risk analysis and to situate it
in its context. It notably helps to specify the system’s issues, its use context, its tasks
and services.
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This step is structured into three actions:
• Studying the organization: this involves defining the scope of the study where
data should be collected on the organization and its information system.
• Studying the target system: this aims at specifying the context of use of the
system to be analyzed.
• Specifying the security study’s target : the purpose of this is to determine
the entities (technical asset) on which the essential elements (essential assets) of
the target system will be based.
Feared events study
This step provides a basis for estimating risks. It allows to express the organization’s
security needs. These security needs are expressed according to different security criteria
such as availability, integrity and confidentiality. The expression of needs is based on the
development and use of a scale of requirements and the identification of unacceptable
impacts on the organization.
Threat scenarios study
This step consists of identifying scenarios that could affect the system’s components.
A threat is characterized by its type (natural, human or environmental) and/or by its
cause (accidental or intentional).
Threats are formulated by identifying their components, methods of attack to which
the organisation is exposed, the threat elements that can use them and the vulnerabil-
ities that can be exploited on the entities of the system and their level.
This step is structured into three actions:
• Investigation of the origins of threats: This includes the identification of
sources in the risk management process.
• Vulnerabilities study: The purpose of this activity is to determine the specific
vulnerabilities of the target system.
• Threat formulation: aims to formulate an objective insight into the threats
affecting the target system
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Risks study
This step allows threats to be confronted with security needs. This confrontation helps
to identify and prioritize the risks that are truly likely to affect the organization’s
important assets. It also makes it possible to set security objectives to cover risks and
to determine the appropriate level of resistance to meet these objectives.
5.2.2 EBIOS Method for IICS risk assessment
We studied the feasibility and the necessity of extending the EBIOS risk analysis
method to suit the industrial context. The objective is to create a fully IICS oriented
version of the EBIOS method. Our starting point was the industrial specificities that
make the difference between ICS and Corporate systems, especially from a security
standpoint. The main points of difference lie in the characteristics of the system com-
ponents:
• ICS components have different functions from IT components (different functional
levels),
• They have different technical types (IT vs OT)
• Industrial processes are different from IT processes (Production centric vs Data
centric).
• Their security requirements are also different
On the other hand, the main goal of a risk analysis is to evaluate the risk. Risk as
defined by EBIOS is a function of the likelihood of a feared event and its gravity.
The industrial systems specificities mentioned below do not have any influence on
the calculation of a risk because the concepts of feared event, its probability and its
gravity remain very high level concepts that are applicable to any system whatever its
nature. The only thing that changes in the EBIOS method usage, from one context to
another, is the context itself.
We therefore came to the conclusion that creating a new EBIOS-based risk analysis
method for industrial systems is not of much interest because EBIOS is already usable
as is. The best we can do is to provide guidance elements and a knowledge database
that assists in working with EBIOS in industrial contexts for users who are only used to
information systems contexts. This was not something we were particularly interested
74 CHAPTER 5. RIICS: RISK BASED IICS SEGMENTATION METHOD
in for our study, but we have slightly customized EBIOS to make it more suitable for
our segmentation method. We will see how this was achieved in the next sections.
5.3 Risk based IICS segmentation Method
5.3.1 The principle
RIICS is a new IICS segmentation method that aims to ensure efficient zoning to meet
actual security needs of IICS. The principle of RIICS is illustrated in Figure 5.2. The
segmentation is done in two phases. First, the system is analyzed and modeled to create
the system’s model that represents the main input of the segmentation phase.
Figure 5.2 – RIICS principle
The system’s modeling is based on the meta-model presented in section 5.3.2 and on
a risk analysis of the whole system. An IICS model primarily focuses on system com-
ponents and their interconnections. Risk analysis allows the evaluation and attribution
of risk levels to the system’s components (section 5.3.2).
At the second phase, the system should first have its boundaries protected before
being segmented. The segmentation operation consists, next, of grouping the system’s
components according to their geo-location, technical type and risk level characteristics
in three cycles. Simply stated, components that have the same geo-location, the same
technical type and the same level of risk constitute together a single security zone.
5.3.2 Analysis and modelling
Risk Analysis
Components modeling requires the evaluation of their risk. This should be carried
out using a risk analysis. We will use a somehow customized version of the EBIOS
[de la Défense Nationale 2010] risk analysis method.
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Risk analysis using EBIOS at the first phase of the method is done in 4 steps as
illustrated in Figure 5.1.
Studying the organization’s context
The first step of risk analysis is to study in depth the technical, functional and
business context of the organization. For the study to be conducted properly, suffi-
cient knowledge of the company’s data, business processes, existing security policy and
procedures, business model and competitors is required. The objective of this step is
to:
• Model the company’s assets
• Model the system architecture (components and connections)
• Acquire sufficient knowledge about technical, functional and business specificities
of the company’s assets.
Modeling the system relies on the meta-model of Figure 5.3. The system system
modeling reuses almost the same modeling concepts introduced by SONICS. The sys-
tem is still modeled as a set of components connected by connections and belonging
to processes and geographical sites. However, it introduces the "risk" as a key charac-
teristic for components. This meta-model also includes the SONICS meta-model but
utilizes a lot of EBIOS concepts. It combines both SONICS and EBIOS meta-models
to preserve the segmentation concepts and make use of the risk concepts. It creates a
bridge between SONICS and risk analysis. This meta-model models a company as a
set of assets. Assets are any valuable resource necessary to achieve the organization’s
objectives. There are two types of them: essential elements and entities. Essential el-
ements are deployed, managed and protected by entities. Entities are assets such as
sites, personnel, equipment, networks, software or systems. Essential elements poten-
tially involve feared events that can occur as a result of an threat scenario operated by
a threat source. Threat scenarios exploit entities vulnerabilities.
• Essential elements
Essential elements of a company are its most important assets. They usually
have many security requirements that should be analyzed and considered by the
risk analysis. Processes and digital data are good examples of essential elements.
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Figure 5.3 – EBIOS Meta-Model
– Processes A Process is a set of interrelated or interacting activities, which
transforms input information into and output". A system is organized into
multiple processes. Each process may contain one or more components. Pro-
cesses identification should be done by the company. In general, an organiza-
tion standard such as ISO9001 is applied to partition the system into multiple
processes. Processes use one or more system components to ensure their oper-
ation. Order placement processes, billing processes, industrial control process,
and secret recipe manufacturing processes are examples of essential elements
processes. Special attention should be paid to confidentiality and integrity
for IT processes and availability for industrial processes.
– Digital Data All data stored, manipulated or exchanged by components
such as databases and file systems. They are highly valued by the company
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and usually are critical assets. Clients personal data, invoices, orders and
SCADA logs are examples of precious data.
• Entities
Entities are assets of the system that perform core functions, process, store and
transmit essential elements. These include physical locations, computing and
human resources, networks, applications and software... As far as our method
is concerned, we pay special attention to Components and Connections because
they are the primary focus of the method.
– Components
Components were defined by the SONICS meta-model in section 4.2.2. How-
ever, for the RIICS method they are only characterized by their:
∗ Geographical Location
∗ Technical Types
∗ Risk Level
This is the novelty of RIICS. Components should also be characterized by
their risk level. It can have one of the risk levels of Table 4.5. Components
risk evaluation will be explained in section 5.3.2. Evaluating the risk
levels of the Components is the main motivation for using a risk analysis
method.
Connections
Connections were defined by the SONICS meta-model in section 4.2.2.
They are modeled the same way by RIICS.
Identify the feared events and estimate their gravity
Feared events are security violations (in terms of confidentiality, integrity and avail-
ability) to one or more essential elements of the system under study. An example of
feared events is the access to some essential elements (such as a clients database) by
a non authorized external person. Each feared event is associated with a gravity level.
Feared events gravity is the extent of its impact on one or more of the company’s
essential elements. It can have one of the gravity scale values from Table 4.3. Grav-
ity estimation is done with a qualitative approach that needs good knowledge of the
organization’s system and business.
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Analyze Threat scenarios and estimate the likelihood of the attack
Threat scenarios are operating mechanisms applied by threat sources (competitors,
enemies, internal opponents, human error...) to violate security of entities (especially
components) in order to achieve a feared event on one or more essential elements.
A threat scenario can be either intentional or accidental. Basic threats typically in-
volve exploiting system vulnerabilities at the organizational, functional, operational,
or design level. Vulnerabilities are identified based on a security diagnosis. Special at-
tention should be paid to potential threat scenarios and vulnerabilities in relation with
components and their connections.
Each threat scenario is associated with a level of likelihood from Table 4.4. This
depends on the attractiveness of the target for the threat source and how easily the
attack can be achieved. Threat sources should be identified and qualified in terms of
capacity and motivation.
Evaluate the risk level
The objective of this step is to assign a risk level value from Table 4.5 to each
component of the system. This requires that the feared events of all the essential
elements hold by the components are identified, their gravity estimated, all threat
scenarios related to these feared events listed and their likelihood estimated.
Figure 5.4 – Risk levels grid
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The risk level of a Component is a function of feared events gravity and their
likelihood. For one feared event and one threat scenario, the risk level is calculated
using the the risk levels grid in Figure 5.4.
The risk level of a component should always be calculated assuming the worst case
using the following formulas:
• The associated risk to an event and a scenario Risk(event, scenario) is calculated
using the risk levels grid.
• The risk associated to a feared event is calculated based on the most probable
threat scenario:
Riskevent = Maxscenarios(Risk(event, scenario))
• The risk associated to an essential element equals the most important risk of its
feared events:
Riskessential = Maxevents(Riskevent)
• The risk associated to component is the most important risk associated to the
essential assets it holds:
Riskcomponent = Maxessentials(Riskessential)
5.3.3 Segmentation
Once the components and connections are completely modeled, components are then
straightforwardly grouped by their geo-location, technical types and risk levels. The
segmentation can be formalized using mathematical objects as below to summarize the
method and provides a useful starting point for implementation.
Preliminary:
Let S an IICS system, S = <C,Ge> where:
• C is the set of components of S,
• Ge is the set of all the geographical sites of S.
• R = {NEGLIGIBLE,CONSIDERABLE,CRITICAL,EXTREME} is the
set of all possible risks levels.
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• T = {TI, TO, TIO} is the set of all possible technical types.
Notations:
∀c ∈ C,
• ttc ∈ T is the technical type of c.
• sitec ∈ Ge is the site to which c belongs.
• riskc ∈ R is the risk level of c.
Definitions:
1. Let Σ(S) the set of all possible segmentations of the system S,
Σ(S) = { σ / σ is a partition of C }
σ is a partition of C if:
• ∅ /∈σ
• ⋃A∈σ A = C
• ∀A,B ∈ σ, A 6= B ⇒A ∩B = ∅
2. For each cycle of the method, we define the cycle’s processor function as:
Prg : Σ(S) → Σ(S)
σ 7→ Prg(σ)
Prg(σ) = {A′ ⊂ C/∀c, d ∈ A′,∃A ∈ σ where c, d ∈ A and g(c) = g(d) }
where g is the cycle’s grouping function that depends on the cycle and respects
the following definition:
g : C → G
c 7→ g(c)
G is a set of grouping values such as sites, technical types and risk levels. Thus:
• The technical grouping function is:
tech : C → T
c 7→ tech(c) = ttc
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• The geolocation grouping function is:
geo : C → Ge
c 7→ geo(c) = sitec
• The risk level grouping function is:
risk : C → R
c 7→ risk(c) = riskc
3. We finally define RIICS as:
RIICS(S) : Σ(S) → Σ(S)
σ 7→ Prrisk ◦ Prtech ◦ Prgeo
Let us assume that σinitial, is the initial segmentation of the system S,
σresult = RIICS(S)(σinitial), is the result of the application of RIICS on the system
S.
Application example
Figure 5.5 – Application example (1/4) - IICS System to segment
As an application example of the segmentation phase, let us assume that we have the
modeled system of Figure 5.5. The example IICS system consists of a Corporate sub-
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system and an industrial system geographically divided into two sites. The Corporate
system belongs to the first site and only contains one ERP and one CRM. They are
connected to the SCADA Server and historian from the ICS system of the first site.
For simplicity, we assume that the components risks are already evaluated as depicted
by the Figure. The technical types are assigned based on the definitions provided
in section 5.3.2. For example, ERP and CRM are IT components, whereas, SCADA
Servers, PLCs, sensors and actuators are OT components. The segmentation is then
straightforwardly done in 3 steps as illustrated by Figures 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8.
1. The first step consists of grouping components by their geo-location. The system is
composed of two geographical sites, therefore, we obtain two geographical segments
(Figure 5.6).
Figure 5.6 – Application example (2/4) - Geo-location Segmentation
2. Next, we group components according to their technical types inside the already
identified geographical segments (Figure 5.7). The first geographical segment is
then divided into two technical segments (one for IT components, and another for
OT components). Whereas, the second geographical segment remains unchanged
because it only contains OT components.
5.3. RISK BASED IICS SEGMENTATION METHOD 83
Figure 5.7 – Application example (3/4) - Technical Segmentation
Figure 5.8 – Application example (4/4) - Risk based Segmentation
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3. Finally, components are grouped based on their risk inside the already identified
segments (Figure 5.8). Only one risk based segment is then added inside the “OT
Segment 1”. The other risk based segments are identical to the previously identified
segments.
5.4 Tests and validation
For validation tests, we applied the same SONICS test methodology presented in
section 4.3.1 to the same test system presented in 4.3.2.
5.4.1 Results and Discussion
The application of RIICS to the test system resulted in a segmentation similar to the
Ex-Segmentation (Figure 4.9). The distance between the two segmentations is equal to
zero. This result does not guarantee the efficiency of the method because it was obtained
with only one system. The creation of several test systems with an Ex-Segmentation
being very expensive, we have not yet been able to carry out all the tests necessary to
validate the method. Nevertheless, initial results remain encouraging. Furthermore, the
test system’s risk analysis, is clearly not affordable for everyone. It requires a minimum
level of knowledge and expertise in this type of practice. However, once the system
model is created, the segmentation phase remains fairly quite simple.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter presents RIICS, an IICS segmentation method that aims to fill the gaps
of SONICS method to guarantee more accurate results that meet actual security needs
of IICS. It is based on a risk analysis that helps to assess components risk. Systems
models are used by the method to delineate security zones by grouping components
with the same characteristics.
The first results of our validation test were rather accurate. However, we still have
many more tests to do before we can confirm the effectiveness of the method. It is
especially necessary to apply the method to a variety of systems with different configu-
ration and various functional and business specificities. The cost of finding or creating
test systems remains, however, significantly high.
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Note that RIICS, just like SONICS, is also applicable to Information Systems (with-
out any industrial system), because it is generic and because Corporate systems are
subsystems of IICS.
However, segmentation is only about setting logical boundaries between security
zones, and is not enough to apply a security policy or to implement a defense in
depth strategy. Real physical boundaries have to be set up. This is achieved through
segregation and access controls techniques.
The issue with ICS integration represents a new use case in terms of flow filtering
mechanisms. The next chapter will present our study on improving flows controls of
integrated ICS systems taking into account the IICS specificities. We propose to study
using enhanced security techniques such as DTE for this purpose.

CHAPTER
6 DTE Access control
model for IICS systems
6.1 Introduction
We designed RIICS method for segmentation of integrated ICS systems to simplify
the identification of security segments by grouping components with the same secu-
rity characteristics. A segment must be managed by the same security policy and
maintained at the same level of protection. Segmentation is only about setting logical
boundaries between segments, and is not enough to apply a security policy or to imple-
ment a defense in depth strategy. Real physical boundaries have to be set up. This is
achieved through segregation and access controls techniques. They are used to control
flows into and out of segments and flows between external and internal networks. This
creates a defense barrier at segments boundaries to protect valuable resources. How-
ever, our study of the state of the art on segregation has revealed that no framework
for segregation exists to date. All the resources we studied on segregation and access
control provide either very specific solutions or good practices guidelines to implement
segregation [Force and Initiative 2013, ISA 2013, ANSSI 2013].
Most of the proposed segregation solutions are firewall-based. While conventional
firewalls perfectly work for Corporate systems, they are not always fully compati-
ble with ICS. In fact, ICS systems usually are very demanding in terms of tim-
ing requirements while conventional firewalls may introduce significant latency. Fire-
walls are generally deployed on the boundaries of the segments to control all outgo-
ing and incoming flows which creates a significant load. The deep inspection mech-
anism used by firewalls introduces a processing time that, however negligible it
may be, becomes, by a mass effect, significant enough to challenge the use of fire-
walls in a context with very high timing requirements such as industrial systems
[Cheminod et al. 2016, Zvabva et al. 2018, Li et al. 2018, Parra et al. 2019]. Firewalls
inside ICS may thus constitute an angle of denial-of-service attack if their timing
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impact is not seriously taken into account. Besides, most of existing firewalls only
support protocols commonly used in Corporate systems especially TCP/IP and, for
the best, some industrial protocols such as ModBus and DNP3 ([Tof 2014]) but
with no possibility to define custom packet inspections to support more protocols
[Cereia et al. 2014b, Cereia et al. 2014a, Li et al. 2018].
Therefore, we believe that a fundamentally more adapted access control mechanism
is required to control flows within IICS with respect of the systems requirements. The
new access control mechanism should:
• Apply strict controls on all flows, especially on communication with other networks
• Respect the timing requirements of industrial systems
• Allow to customize packet inspection to extend supported protocols. This will
especially allow to support more industrial protocols.
• Simplify the definition of control rules to make it easier for administrators, espe-
cially industrial system administrators because they are less familiar with security
concepts.
Domain and Type Enforcement (DTE) [Badger et al. 1995, Oostendorp et al. 2000]
is an access control mechanism that holds promise to provide needed flexibility and
strength while enforcing access controls. We suggest to study and explore whether
security-enhanced control access, such as DTE, can be used to implement flow controls
within IICS and replace the traditional IT firewalls.
There have been some studies investigating the use of DTE techniques on IICS
systems such as the research work done by Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories
[Bradetich and Oman 2007]. Although their findings are interesting, they are lim-
ited to securing integration flows with DTE techniques. Our objective in this study
is to generalize DTE controls to the whole system by providing a generic model
that provides simple and consistent concepts that allow control rules to be de-
fined in a straightforward and homogeneous way across the system. Our work
is a continuation of Trusted Information Systems, Inc.’s work on DTE Firewalls
[Bradetich and Oman 2007, Bradetich and Oman 2008] that were the first to suggest
using DTE for firewalls. However, our work is more focused on integrated ICS systems.
After reviewing the primary concepts of DTE, we will present the first phase of our
study of using DTE for securing ICS and Corporate systems flows. We will present our
generic ruleset based on the generic model provided by ISA95.
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6.2 Data Type Enforcement concepts
6.2.1 DTE
DTE was originally proposed by Boebert and Kain [Oostendorp et al. 2000].
It is an enhanced form of table-oriented mandatory access control mechanism
[Oostendorp et al. 2000, Hallyn and Kearns 2000a].
As with many access control schemes, type enforcement considers the system as a
set of active entities (subjects) and a set of passive entities (objects).
• Active entities or subjects (usually processes). A domain and a DTE-protected
user identifier (unchangeable even by the root user) is associated with each active
entity, or subject
• Passive entities or objects (e.g., IPC messages, files or network packets). A type is
associated with each passive entity, or object;
In DTE, two domain tables are considered:
• Domain Definition Table (DDT) represents allowed access modes between domains
and types (e.g. read, lock, write, execute)
• Domain Interaction Table (DIT) represents allowed access modes between domains
(e.g. signal, create)
Similarly to RBAC [Ferraiolo et al. 1995], all access attempts which are not au-
thorised directly in the tables are denied. DTE policies can be specified in various
languages (DTEL, SELinux TE language etc.). DTE policy should commonly imple-
ment the following components:
• Type declares one or more object types later used in the DDT
• Domain defines a restricted execution environment composed of three parts:
– “Entry point” programs, identified by full pathname, that a process has to
execute in order to enter the correct domain (e.g. /usr/sbin/sshd, /bin/login)
– access rights to types of objects (e.g. read or append to /etc/password)
– access rights to subjects in other domains (e.g. transition)
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• Initial domain - defines the domain of the first process
• Assign - associates a type with one or more files
DTE has three main advantages. First, the security policy is specified in a high
level language that reduces the burden of expressing, verifying, and maintaining se-
curity rules. Second, security attributes on objects are implicit, thereby allowing a
file hierarchy to be typed concisely. Finally, DTE provides mechanisms for backward
compatibility with existing software and with systems not running DTE.
6.2.2 DTE Firewalls
The DTE Firewalls were initially proposed by Trusted Information Systems, Inc.
[Bradetich and Oman 2007, Bradetich and Oman 2008] to connect partner companies
with a high level of security by extending limited trust to external entities, for example,
suppliers, bankers, accountants, advisors, consultants, partners, customers, and allies
[Oostendorp et al. 2000].
To extend DTE protection across networks, each network packet is regarded as an
object (passive entity) with three associated attributes (carried in the IP option space
of each datagram): the DTE type of the information, the domain (source domain) of the
source process, and the DTE-protected UID of the source process. A process can send
or receive a message object only if the process’s domain has the appropriate access to
the DTE type of the message. Communication with non-DTE systems also is mediated:
when a message originates from a non-DTE host, the receiving DTE system assigns
a type (and domain) to the message. Similarly, a DTE system mediates a message
before sending it to a non-DTE system to ensure that the domain associated with
the non-DTE system can read the messages. If the associated domain cannot read the
message’s type, the message is not sent.
6.3 DTE access control Model
We have created a generic access control model based on DTE. This new model, when
implemented and applied to IICS, responds to the four requirements we presented be-
fore. The next sections provide the formal definition of the model and present the syntax
to use to define the different DTE rules and concepts. We have created a DTEL lan-
guage extension to represent the new concepts introduced by our model while remaining
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compatible with the standard version of DTEL. Domains, objects and permissions are
defined using almost the same syntax of the DTE language with a few new features.
6.3.1 Security policy definition
Entities
Unlike traditional access control approaches that define entities as hosts that send
packets, entities for DTE consist of the processes that are running on the system.
• Notation:
Let P the set of all the processes of a system S, Ci is a component that belongs
to the system S and SCi is its operating system. We can define S such that:
S =
n⋃
i=1
Ci
• Property 1:
The set of entities of an operating system SCi on a component Ci is defined as
E(SCi) where:
E(SCi) ⊆ P
An entity (a process) is defined as a pair of the component on which it runs and its
runnable file on that component’s system:
e = (parent_component, file_path)
For example a process OpenERP that is run on an ERP_Server using the file
/bin/openerp is equal to:
OpenERP = (ERP_Server, /bin/openerp)
Services
Our new model allows to group processes into services. A service is a set of processes
that are governed by the same access control rules. A service can group processes that
are not on the same hosts. For example, an OpenERP and an SAP ERP processes can
be grouped into one service ServERP if they have the same access control rules.
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• Property 2:
A service Serv is a set of processes (entities) such that:
∃ n ∈ N∗/∃P0, ..., Pn ∈ P
Serv = {P0, ..., Pn}
• Property 3:
Any service Serv is a subset of P :
Serv ⊆ P
• Property 4:
Let the exec_serv a function that returns the entities executed on a system SCi
for a Servj service:
exec_serv(SCi, Servj) = E(Si) ∩ Servj
A service is a set of component processes pairs. For example, provided the afore-
mentioned ServERP can be defined as: 
1 // define a service
component ERP_Server = 10.0.0.13;
component SAP_Server = 10.0.0.14;
4 Serv_ERP ={( ERP_Server , /bin/openerp), (SAP_Server , /bin/sap),
...}; 
For example, assuming that the ERP OpenERP is running on a server with a linux
operating system SSL from the path /bin/openerp:
exec_serv(SSL, ServERP ) = {/bin/openerp}.
The service view helps to abstract processes and define common access control
rules. This is easier to handle for systems administrators with limited IT and security
knowledge once processes are defined.
Objects
A DTE object is any system resource that can be accessed by an entity. In the context of
DTE, objects are generally files, memory space... For network communication, objects
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are the packets that are transmitted between entities. Our model will mainly focus on
this type of object.
An object can be defined as a set of attributes that are transmitted as portions of
the packet. Objects attributes are, for example, the source or destination IP address,
the source or destination port, data from the application layer...
In order not to have to extend the syntax of the model with each new protocol, the
attributes are defined by their position in the packet. This allows to model objects and
their attributes in a generic way and ensures very loose coupling between the objects
attributes and the underlying protocols that can be replaced or updated over time.
• Property 5:
An attribute c is defined as a vector that indicates its position in the packet:
c = < offset, length >
For example, we can represent the TCP port source within a packet that has
a length of 2 bytes and is at position 0 of the TCP segment that is itself
encapsulated in a 20-byte header IP packet that is itself encapsulated in a 14-byte
header Ethernet frame as:
TCPsrc−port = < 34, 2 >
• Property 6:
Let OS the set of objects within a system S. An object is defined as a set of
attributes with their associated values:
∀n ∈ N o =< ((c1, valeur1), ..., (cn, valeurn)) >∈ OS
⇒ ∀i ∈ [1, ..., n]
ci.offset ∈ [1, ..., packetmax−size]
and ci.length+ ci.offset ≤ packetmax−size
Below are some examples of object definitions:
• o =< (< 36, 2 >, 80) > represents all packets with a destination port equal to 80.
They are generally requests for a web server.
94 CHAPTER 6. DTE ACCESS CONTROL MODEL FOR IICS SYSTEMS
• o =< (< 30, 4 >, 10.0.0.1), (< 36, 2 >, 502), (< 61, 1 >, 3) > represents all the
packets of a Modbus TCP/IP connection to the machine with an IP address of
10.0.0.0.1. This represents a Modbus request to read a register.
By defining objects this way, it is easier to handle new protocols without having
to modify the implementation of the rule engine and access control mechanism. In
addition, for similar protocols in terms of payload such as SCTP/TCP, it is possible
to reuse rules that include objects with identical attributes.
Types
Objects can be grouped into groups called types.
• Property 7:
Let TS the set of all the types within the system S, a type is defined as:
∀t ∈ T t = {o1, ..., on} → ∀i ∈ [1, ..., n], oi ∈ OS
In order to remain compatible with DTE Languge (DTEL), we use exactly the same
syntax to define types and assign them to objects except that the definition of objects
is slightly different from DTEL. 
1 type type_name;
assign type_name object; 
For example: 
type read_register;
assign read_register <(<30,4 >,10.0.0.1) ,(<36,2>,502) ,(<61,1>,3)
>; 
Actions
In a DTE context, entities can perform actions on packet objects of a particular type.
Three possible actions can be distinguished:
• send:
this action represents the possibility to send a DTE object type by entities
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• receive:
represents the possibility to receive a DTE object type
• send_state:
is used to support connection oriented protocols of the transport layer. That is,
protocols where messages can be bi-directional once the connection is initiated by
the sender that can then receive messages from the receiver if they comply with
the protocol state machine.
Domains
A DTE domain is a list of tuples ({entities}, (action→ object_type)).
The initial DTEL allows to define inter-domain controls to define which domains
are authorized to interact and the actions that can be performed. Only process-related
interactions (sending signals, creating processes...) are supported.
Therefore, the initial DTEL has to be extended in order to:
• Support the new actions defined previously (send, receive, send_state) in order to
allow processes from different domains to communicate (exchange objects) with
each other.
• Limit access to some objects. When a domain is authorized to communicate with
another domain, it is necessary to define which DTE objects are allowed to be
exchanged between these two DTE domains.
We will use the following syntax:
A domain can be defined using the new DTEL syntax as follows: 
type some_object_type_1;
type some_object_type_2;
3
domain some_domain = (
/* first tuple */
6 {
(component_a_1 , process_path_a_1),
(component_a_2 , process_path_a_2),
9 ...
},
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( action_1 -> another_domain_1{some_object_type })
12
/* second tuple */
{
15 (component_b , process_path_b_1),
(component_2 , process_path_2),
...
18 },
( action_2 -> another_domain_2{some_object_type_2 })
21 /* more tuples */
...
); 
where (componenti, process_path_i) are entities, and actioni can be “send”, “re-
ceive” or “send_state”.
For example: 
type schedule_production;
3 domain erp_domain = (
{(ERPServer , /bin/openerp)} ,
(send -> manufactoring_domain{schedule_production })
6 ); 
Since services are themselves sets of processes, entities that belong to a domain can
include individual processes or services as well. For example: 
1 type schedule_production;
Serv_ERP ={( ERP_Server , /bin/openerp), (SAP_Server , /bin/sap)};
4
domain erp_domain = (
{Serv_ERP} ,
7 (send -> manufactoring_domain{schedule_production })
); 
This is only an extension of the DTEL syntax that remains compatible with the
original syntax. If the authorized DTE objects are not specified, the behavior defined by
initial DTEL is applied, which allows actions to be performed on the entire destination
DTE domain.
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• Property 8:
Each entity belongs to one or multiple domains.
6.3.2 Domains communication
DTE domains are a logical grouping of entities. The system’s flow control rules pri-
marily rely on them such that:
• Property 9:
Inter-domain flows are by default denied. An explicit rule should be added to
authorize a communication between two domains.
• Property 10:
Flows between entities that belong to a same domain are permitted.
Mediation
In a DTE context, some hosts (source or destination) may not be DTE compatible. In
order to properly process objects sent by a non-DTE host, it is necessary to determine
the domain of the sender. Mediation is a mechanism that associates DTE domains to
non-DTE entities. It uses the packet headers to determine the DTE type of the packet
and the DTE domain to which the sending or receiving entity belongs.
To perform the mediation, the DTEL language defines the inter_assign command
with the following syntax: 
inter_assign object_definition a_domain; 
It is necessary to precisely determine the domains of processes executed on non-
DTE hosts that may contain processes from different domains. It is important to wisely
use objects’attributes that precisely identify the corresponding domain. It is possible
to identify non-DTE processes based on hosts’source and destination IP addresses as
well as ports, or application-level protocols.
For example, to assign the “web” domain to a non-DTE web server process running
on host 10.0.0.13: 
1 inter_assign <( <30 ,4 > ,10.0.0.13) ,(<36,2>,80)> web; 
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Segments
The system may be segmented into multiple segments. A segment is generally tech-
nically implemented a sub-network or a VPN [Andress and Leary 2017] in which all
communications that respect the segment’s security policy are allowed, but where ac-
cess control equipment such as firewalls are placed at the segment’s boundaries to
control all incoming and outgoing flows.
For example, in TCP/IP systems, two important rules are applied in regard to
segments:
• Components can determine whether another component belongs to the same seg-
ment, to decide whether it can directly communicate with it or if it must cross a
gateway. This can be done for example using ip masking techniques.
• Components within the same sub-network communicate with each others to con-
figure themselves using protocols such as ICMP, IGMP, ARP.
Using DTE in a segmented system is problematic. Flows between DTE domains are
by default denied while intra-segment flows can be permitted by the security policy
that governs the segment. If a segment contains components that run entities that
belong to different domains, communication between these entities will be by default
denied by the DTE controls.
Figure 6.1 – Segmentation and multi-domain problem
For example, in Figure 6.1, components C1 and C2 belong to the same segment.
C1 runs two processes P1 and P2 which belong to domains D1 and D2 respectively. C2
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runs processes P3 and P4, which belong to domains D1 and D2 respectively. While P3
and P1 are authorized to communicate as they belong to the same domain D1, P2 and
P1 are not authorized to communicate unless an explicit authorization rule is defined.
This is an unwanted behavior inside a segment where P2 and P1 are authorized to
communicate.
The reason for such an incompatibility is that inter-domain communication is
DENY-ALL oriented while some communications within a segment should be autho-
rized.
The first and most direct solution to this problem is to add rules to explicitly autho-
rize entities inside the same segment to communicate with each others. However, this
can quickly become a very burdensome task, especially when the system is composed
of a large number of segments.
A more thoughtful solution is to use Properties 8 (6.3.1) and 10 (6.3.2) previously
presented that assert that a process can belong to multiple domains and that the
intra-domain flows are by default permitted. For each segment of the system, we will
define a new domain to group all the processes of that segment that are authorized to
communicate in order to allow communication between them.
Continuing with our previous example, the solution, as illustrated in Figure 6.2, is
to create a new Dseg1 domain that includes all the processes that are authorized to
communicate.
Figure 6.2 – Segmentation management with DTE
Note 1: Mitigate the risk of the intra-segments flow
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Sometimes, some components, although within the same segment, are not allowed to
communicate. For example, to protect a component against the compromise of another
component that communicates with it. The segment domain should then not include
the processes of that vulnerable component. Nevertheless, if a component is known
to be vulnerable and to present a risk for the components within the same segment,
the isolation of that vulnerable component into a separate segment should seriously be
considered.
If the system segmentation is done with the RIICS method, it is unlikely to need
to protect one component against the compromise of another component of the same
segment. Provided the risk analysis is correctly performed, components of the same
segment supposedly are on the same level of risk. The RIICS method separates com-
ponents with a high impact, and a vulnerable components into different segments.
Therefore, by using the RIICS method for segmentation, the authorization of all
intra-segment flows can be acceptable as all components of the same segment are on the
same level of risk. If, in some cases, more controls on intra-segment flows are needed,
this can be achieved by using additional access control mechanisms (other than DTE)
for the concerned flows. However, this is not in the scope of our study.
Note 2: Inter-segments flows control
Inter-segments flows are also controlled. Controls are performed using DTE at the
host level or at the DTE Firewalls deployed on the boundaries between the segments.
More details about the flows control mechanism are provided in the next section. By
creating a domain per segment, inter-segments flows will be controlled using DTE rules
to authorize, for example, two processes from two different segments to communicate.
6.4 Access control
This section explains the operating procedure of our DTE model access controls.
6.4.1 DTE Hosts
While non DTE hosts rely on the mediation mechanism to be DTE-compatible, DTE
hosts natively implement DTE access control inside their Operating System. Multiple
DTE prototypes were developed [Hallyn and Kearns 2000b, Badger et al. 1996]. They
all are based on UNIX. As for our model, a new prototype is needed. However, the
operating procedure of the access control mechanism will be explained.
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6.4.2 Operating procedure
On DTE hosts, access control is applied whenever a packet is sent or received by a
process running on the DTE host. When a packet is sent, the rules defined regarding
the sending domain will be verified. To achieve this, all rules that apply to the process
that sends the packet will be checked. For each rule, the packet is compared to the object
type of the rule trying to return only one rule at most. If a send action authorization
rule matching the object type is found, the packet is allowed to be sent, otherwise it is
rejected.
If the packet is authorized to be sent, the source domain is added to the packet
header (in the option field of the IP header) by the sender (assumed DTE compatible)
before the packet is sent.
When the receiver receives the packet, it identifies all the destination domains. For
each destination domain, the control rules are checked to determine whether such a
packet is allowed to be received. This is done by calculating the source domain and the
type of the packet from the header. If a rule allows such a packet to be received, the
destination process is then allowed to receive it.
6.4.3 DTE Hosts access control
DTE allows access control to be carried over to the edges of communications i.e., to
hosts that support DTE. It is no longer necessary to process all the packets on the
firewall as usual. This allows to define much more fine-grained control rules such as
applying controls at the application level without worrying about the firewalls perfor-
mance. Since firewalls are generally at the segment boundaries, they have to process
all incoming and outgoing packets. Deep packet inspection can drastically reduce the
firewall performance (processing time may reach several tens of milliseconds). However,
when the objects are controlled locally on DTE hosts, where the traffic to be processed
is much smaller, it is possible to apply more sophisticated controls without impacting
the processing time of the objects and their latency. This ensures highly effective access
control while respecting the real-time requirements of the system.
6.4.4 Firewall access controls
DTE firewalls should be deployed at the segments boundaries. They are in charge
of ensuring that access controls are properly performed by the DTE hosts. Message
processing by the firewall can affect the real-time performance of the system. However,
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it does protect against the compromise of some hosts that may bypass the access control
rules for which they are responsible.
In order to optimize the DTE firewall performance, it would be possible that it
does not check the validity of communications of some DTE hosts depending on its
level of trust in those hosts. The trust granted to DTE hosts by a DTE firewall will be
defined by the administrator. This makes the verification process on some DTE objects
more flexible depending on the reputation of the equipment sending the message. The
reputation can be a value calculated based on the application of updates, the version
of the operating system...
Controls on flows to and from hosts in a segment still remain as strict as they
should be because communications from outside a segment are by default not allowed
and must be explicitly authorized. This furthermore reduces the load on Firewalls.
The DTE firewall will also be responsible for mediation between non-DTE and DTE
hosts. Two cases are to consider:
• The source is a non-DTE host:
The firewall is then in charge of determining the host’s source domain based on
the content of the packet using the Mediation mechanism explained in section
6.3.2. Once the source domain is identified, the firewall applies the access right
verification procedure explained in section 6.4.2 in order to verify that the packet
(DTE object) can be transmitted to the destination DTE domain and that the
destination DTE domain accepts to receive such an object.
• The destination is a non-DTE host:
In this case, packet processing is relatively simple for the DTE firewall. The most
important thing is to determine the source domain which is already known in the
case of a DTE source host or determined as described before. When the source
domain is known, it is simple to determine the destination domain based on the
object type and the specified DTE rules before transmitting the packet to its
destination.
6.4.5 Sharing definitions and rules
Definitions and rules must be reusable between DTE equipment, and must also be
locally overwritable. We suggest a new security policy storage and processing strategy.
DTE devices will apply access controls based on two security policies: global security
policy and local security policy.
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Figure 6.3 – DTE global rules management architecture
Global security policy
Global security policy is stored on a central server. It mainly consists of global access
control rules, objects and domains definitions. It is managed by the system’s security
managers.
DTE devices retrieve this global security policy and store it locally in a “Global
access control” module and apply it by default to perform access controls.
Local security policy
Global security policy can be overwitten locally by the device’s administrators and
authorized automated security mechanisms as illustrated in Figure 6.3. Local access
rules are stored in a “Local access control” module. An order of precedence between
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the two modules can be defined to determine whether or not local access control must
override global access control.
Such an approach offers the advantage of being able to strengthen local access
control without completely overriding global access control. For example, a security
mechanism such as an IPS can operate locally on DTE devices to define new rules that
block certain sensitive communications. It will thus be able, if authorized, to modify
the local access control rules without affecting the global security policy.
Local security policy modification
Local security policy can be modified by authorized administrators and automated
security mechanisms. The modification can be performed through a local process on
the DTE host that receives policy modification requests from authorized entities and
perform the requested modification. Access to this local security policy modification
process is controlled using DTE rules.
For example, let’s assume that the local security policy modification process is
executed on the DTE device from /bin/modif_acl as a daemon that listens on port
5000. This process can be used to modify the local access control file /etc/local_acl.
To authorize an IPS /bin/snort process to use the modif_acl process in order to
make changes on the local_acl file, the following rules are created : 
1 type modif_acl;
type modif_acl_com;
4 component IPS_Server = 10.0.0.23;
component My_Host = 10.0.1.9;
7 domain ips =
{( IPS_Server , /bin/snort)},
(send_state -> host(modif_acl_com });
10
domain host =
{(My_Host , /bin/modif_acl)}, (receive -> ips{modif_acl_com
}), {(My_Host , /bin/modif_acl)}, (rw ->modif_acl);
13
assign /etc/local_acl modif_acl;
assign <(<36,2>, 5000)> modif_acl_com; 
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Thus, Snort process will be authorized to send policy modification requests to the
DTE Host on port 5000. When such a request is received, the /bin/modif_acl process
is authorized to accept it and process it. The /bin/modif_acl process is, on the other
hand, authorized to read and modify (rw) the /etc/local_acl file. However, it is not
allowed to read or write the global access control file.
6.5 Application of DTE access control to IICS
Our control access model divides the system into multiple logical domains that include
the different entities. The definition of domains and control rules are to be defined on a
case-by-case basis depending on the system, however a large part of the access control
policies is totally generic and can be applied to all IICS. This generic part is based on
the functional integration model defined by ISA [ISA 1999] which defines the functions
of an enterprise involved with manufacturing as well as the information flows between
the functions that cross the Corporate/ICS interface.
6.5.1 Functional Model
The ISA [ISA 1999] functional model represents IICS as a set of functions, external
entities and communication flows between them. It focuses on manufacturing IICS.
For this model, functions are a set of tasks with a common objective and are repre-
sented by a marked ellipses in the Figure. External entities are entities that exchanges
data with the functions from outside the system. They are represented as a labelled
rectangle. A solid line with an arrow represents data flows between functions, or exter-
nal entities. A dotted line with an arrow represents a groups of data flows. The heavy
dotted line illustrates the integration layer between the Corporate and ICS systems. It
intersects functions that have sub-functions that may belong to the ICS system, or to
the Corporate system depending on the system. This line is equivalent to the Level 3
- Level 4 interface defined in Chapter 2.
The ICS side of the integration layer includes Production Control functions and
some of the Quality, Maintenance, Production Scheduling and Product Control func-
tions. Whereas, the Corporate side includes business functions such as Order Process-
ing, Product Cost Accounting, etc. However, the model structure does not reflect an
organizational structure within a company, but an organizational structure of func-
tions. Different companies will place the functions in different organizational groups.
Functions and flows are out of scope.
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6.5.2 Generic policy
We will use the generic functional model to create a generic part of the DTE security
policy that should be deployed on an IICS system. The used functions represent DTE
domains, and the flows between the functions represent the flows to be controlled. They
represent the objects types.
This generic policy is intended to simplify the deployment of DTE access control
and provide a good introduction to the concepts of domains and types of packets for
administrators. However it remains, of course, extensible. The creation of new types,
domains and control rules will be possible globally and locally.
Domains and Objects
For each functional domain, a DTE domain is defined. The interactions between these
domains correspond to the DTE objects exchanged by the domains. Each domain
contains a list of services.
Services
Besides the domains, our generic policy also includes definitions of some generic ser-
vices. These were identified based on our reference architecture. They are:
• ERP Services
This service includes all processes that can be grouped under the name of ERP.
These are the different ERP software solutions that are deployed in the Corporate
System. ERP services generally perform functions of “Order Processing”, “Pro-
duction Scheduling”, “Material and Energy Control” and “Procurement”.
• CRM Services Includes all CRM processes of the Corporate System. They gen-
erally carry out the functions of “Order Processing”, “Product shiping admin” and
“Product Cost Accounting”.
• MES Services Contains the MES processes of the ICS. They generally per-
form the functions of “Product inventory”, “Quality Assurance” and “Production
Scheduling”.
• Industrial Control Services Includes ICS SCADA processes. They generally
perform the “Production Control” functions.
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• Maintenance Services Includes all entities involved in “Maintenance Manage-
ment” functions such as maintenance tools installed on workstations.
• Support Services includes all cross-functional entities that handle other
transversal functions of the system such as printing, emailing....
A summary of these services is provided in the table below 6.1.
Table 6.1 – Generic IICS Services
CRM
Services
ERP
Services
MES
Services
Industrial
Control
Services
Maintenance
Services
Production
Control X
Product
Shipping
Admin X
Product
Cost Ac-
counting X
Order
Processing X X
Production
Scheduling X X
Material
and
Energy
Control X X
Procurement X
Quality
Assurance X
Product
Inventory
Control X
Maintenance
Manage-
ment X
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Access control rules
• Property 11: Any DTE equipment in an IICS will have at least the following
DTE rules:
 
/*
3 The services below should be defined by manager
Exp: define ERP_SERVICES = (/bin/openerp), (/bin/sap)
*/
6 /*
define ERP_SERVICES ,
CRM_SERVICES ,
9 MES_SERVICES ,
INDUSTRIAL_CONTROL_SERVICES ,
MAINTENANCE_SERVICES ,
12 SUPPORT_SERVICES;
*/
15 domain Order_Processing =
{CRM_SERVICES ,ERP_SERVICES}, (receive ->
Production_Cost_Accounting
{cost_availability }),
18 {CRM_SERVICES ,ERP_SERVICES}, (receive ->
Production_Scheduling{availability }),
{CRM_SERVICES ,ERP_SERVICES}, (send_state ->
Product_Cost_Accounting
{production_orders_acc }),
21 {CRM_SERVICES ,ERP_SERVICES}, (send_state ->Quality_Assurance
{finished_good_waiver });
domain Production_Scheduling =
24 {ERP_SERVICES ,MES_SERVICES}, (receive ->Order_Processing{
production_orders }),
{ERP_SERVICES ,MES_SERVICES}, (receive ->Production_Control{
production_capacity ,
production_from_plan }),
27 {ERP_SERVICES ,MES_SERVICES}, (receive ->
Product_Inventory_Control),
{ERP_SERVICES ,MES_SERVICES}, (send_state ->Order_Processing{
availability }),
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{ERP_SERVICES ,MES_SERVICES}, (send_state ->
Product_Inventory_Control
30 {pack_out_schedule }),
{ERP_SERVICES ,MES_SERVICES}, (send_state ->
Production_Control{schedule }),
{ERP_SERVICES ,MES_SERVICES}, (send_state ->
Material_and_Energy_Control
33 {LTME_requirements });
domain Production_Cost_Accounting =
36 {CRM_SERVICES}, (receive -> Product_Shipping_Admin
{cost_availability }),
{CRM_SERVICES}, (receive ->Order_Processing{availability }),
39 {CRM_SERVICES}, (send_state ->Product_Shipping_Admin
{production_orders_acc }),
{CRM_SERVICES}, (receive ->Order_Processing{
production_orders_acc }),
42 {CRM_SERVICES}, (send_state ->Production_Control{
production_cost_objectives }),
{CRM_SERVICES}, (receive_state ->Production_Control{
production_performance_and_cost }),
{CRM_SERVICES}, (receive ->Material_and_Energy_Control{
45 incm_material_and_energy_receipt });
48 domain Product_Shipping_Admin=
{CRM_SERVICES}, (receive -> Product_Cost_Accounting
{cost_availability }),
51 {CRM_SERVICES}, (receive ->Product_Inventory_Control{
availability }),
{CRM_SERVICES}, (send_state ->Product_Cost_Accounting
{}),
54 {CRM_SERVICES}, (send_state ->Product_Inventory_Control {}),
});
57 domain Procurement=
{ERP_SERVICES}, (receive -> Material_and_Energy_Control {
incm_order_confirmation }),$
{ERP_SERVICES}, (receive -> Material_and_Energy_Control {
material_and_energy_order_req }),
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60 {ERP_SERVICES}, (receive ->Maintenance_Management{
maint_purchase_order_req }),
});
63
domain Material_and_Energy_Control =
{ERP_SERVICES},MES_SERVICES , (receive ->Production_Control{
66 LT_material_and_energy_requirements }),
{ERP_SERVICES},MES_SERVICES , (send_state ->Procurement{
material_and_energy_order_req }),
69 {ERP_SERVICES},MES_SERVICES , (send_state ->Procurement{
incoming_order_confirmation }),
{ERP_SERVICES},MES_SERVICES , ( s e n d _ s t a t e >
Product_Cost_Accounting{
incm_material_and_energy_receipt });
72
domain Quality_Assurance
{MES_SERVICES },(send_state ->Production_Control{
standards_and_customer_requirements }),
75 {MES_SERVICES },(send_state >Production_Control{QA_results }),
{MES_SERVICES },(receive ->Production_Control{process_data }),
{MES_SERVICES },(send_state ->Product_Inventory_Control{
QA_results }),
78 {MES_SERVICES },(receive ->Order_Processing{
finished_goods_waiver });
domain Product_Inventory_Control
81 {MES_SERVICES },(receive ->Product_Shipping_Admin {}),
{MES_SERVICES },(send_state >Product_Shipping_Admin {}),
{MES_SERVICES },(receive ->Quality_Assurance{QA_results }),
84 {MES_SERVICES },(receive ->Production_Scheduling{
back_out_schedule }),
{MES_SERVICES },(send_state >Production_Scheduling{
finished_goods_inventory }),
{MES_SERVICES },(receive ->Production_Control{process_data });
87
domain Maintenance_Management
90 {Maintenance_SERVICES },(receive ->Production_Control{
maint_standards_and_methods }),
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{Maintenance_SERVICES },(receive ->Production_Control{
maint_requests }),
{Maintenance_SERVICES },(send_state ->Production_Control{
maint_responses }),
93 {Maintenance_SERVICES },(send_state ->Production_Control{
maint_technical_feedback }),
{Maintenance_SERVICES },(send_state >Procurement{
maint_purchase_order_req });
96
/* The types below should be defined by the manager */
/*
99 type production_orders ,
availability ,
cost_availability ,
102 finished_good_inventory ,
finished_good_waiver ,
incm_material_and_energy_receipt ,
105 incm_order_confirmation ,
LTME_requirements ,
LT_material_and_energy_requirements ,
108 standards_and_customer_requirements ,
maint_purchase_order_req ,
material_and_energy__order_requirements ,
111 maint_requests ,
maint_standards_and_methods ,
maint_technical_feedback ,
114 maint_responses ,
production_orders_acc ,
production_cost_objectives ,
117 production_performance_and_cost ,
production_orders ,
production_capability ,
120 production_from_plan ,
process_data ,
pack_out_schedule ,
123 schedule ,
QA_results;
/* 
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These rules are totally generic because they are based on generic domains, ser-
vices and actions. Nevertheless, all the types of objects used by this generic policy
as well as the processes belonging to the services are to be defined according to the
system. For example, this generic policy defines an Order_Processing domain, the ser-
vices that belong to it, and authorized actions such as sending and receiving certain
types of packets like (“ProductionOrder_Acc”), however, it remains up to the admin-
istrators to define the object (ProductionOrder_Acc) and the processes that belong to
CRM_SERVICES.
6.6 Discussion
6.6.1 Advantages
The advantages of using DTE to implement an access control mechanism in IICS
systems are numerous:
A single language for access control
The first advantage of DTE access control is that it uses a single rule-setting language
across all systems. This reduces the complexity of administering multiple access control
solutions with their languages at the same time. In addition, the centralization of rules
and definitions provides a main entry point for administration that will be used most
often for changes. These rules can still be overloaded on the hosts with the same
language.
Language for defining high-level security policies
The service view provides more independence regarding the location of access controls
in the system. It can be used for network access control (as it is usually found on a
firewall) as well as access control for an operating system. It is totally independent of
the equipment on which these services are performed. This service vision cannot be
achieved with traditional access control mechanisms.
We can see that it is very easy to define rules because it is similar to what admin-
istrators are familiar with, namely the interactions between services in their systems.
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Compliance with industrial constraints
While our DTE model is not specifically designed for industrial systems, it fully re-
sponds to their requirements. Using a host-based control mechanism helps to reduce
the need for firewalls to control communication between DTE components, which im-
proves response times between them. At the same time, it reduces firewalls’workload,
which, even with some flows filtering and DTE mediation, ensures faster response times
and therefore responds better to the system timing requirements.
Support of different protocols
Objects definition method allows to support different protocols as long as the content
of the packets is known. This allows to cover protocols that are not currently supported
by commercial firewalls.
6.6.2 Possible improvements
Objects definition
DTE objects definition can be more modular in order to be able to define new objects
from existing ones by composing or extending them. For example, all web packets can
be an extension of the basic definition: 
assign <(<36,2>,80)> web 
Specific web packets can be defined by extending the “web” object definition as
follows: 
assign <web , ( <30 ,4 > ,10.0.0.1)> to_my_web_server 
which defines web requests addressed to the server 10.0.0.1.
Reusable values
Similarly, the values used in objects definitions can be defined as constants to allow
their reuse. For example: 
const my_web_server_ip = 10.0.0.1
2 to_my_web_server = <web , (<30,4>, my_web_server_ip)> 
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Loose object definitions
DTE objects can only be defined in accordance with the system. In order to simplify
this task as much as possible, one or more objects will be defined for each DTE type.
Depending on the trust you have in DTE hosts, it is possible to more or less finely
define the access control rules. For example, if there is a high degree of trust in certain
equipment, the definition of the objects that are used in the rules related to this equip-
ment could be as broad as possible, for example without specifying all the attributes of
objects (e.g. IP addresses). In such a case, any DTE equipment performing the desired
service may accept or reject these objects. Such flexibility ensures independence from
the machine on which the service is running. On the other hand, such flexibility can
affect the security of the system. If a trusted DTE machine is compromised, such broad
rules can be used to bypass security policy. In fact, if trust is limited in some machines,
it will be preferred to define objects much more finely such as with the quadruplet
(source IP address, source Port, destination IP address, destination Port).
Client VS Server processes
A process belonging to a service that itself is part of a domain is governed by the rules
of that domain. However, a process can be a server, a client, or both. The generic rules
we defined apply to processes in both cases. However, sometimes, the access controls
to be done can be different for server processes and client processes. The manager is
then responsible for adapting the generic rules to take this into account this differences
based on the process.
6.7 Conclusion
This chapter presents our study of using DTE access control to secure IICS systems
flows.
After reviewing the primary concepts of DTE Firewalls, we presented the first phase
of our study of using DTE in IICS context. A large part of the access control policies
is generic and can be applied to all IICS. Therefore we proposed a generic access
control policy based on the generic functional model provided by ISA95. We have
therefore extended the initial DTE model, and formalized it to define a generic model
of flow controls for integrated systems. This generic policy is intended to simplify the
deployment of DTE access control and provide a good introduction to the concepts of
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domains and types of packets for managers. However, it remains extensible by creating
new types, domains and control rules.
The advantages of using DTE acces control in IICS systems are numerous. First,
DTE reduces the complexity of using multiple access control solutions by using a
single centralized rule-setting language across all the system. Besides, access controls
are applied locally on DTE enabled hosts which lightens Firewalls workload and allows
to respect industrial timing requirements. In addition, our model introduces the new
service view that provides more independence regarding the equipment processes are
running on.
The next step of our study would be to implement and test the proposed model
in order to confirm its usefulness in the context of ICS integration. This will not be
covered by this report.

CHAPTER
7 Conclusions and
Perspectives
To conclude, we give an overview on how the different research objectives presented
in the introduction have been followed as well as the different contributions that have
been made. Afterwards, we will discuss the possible perspectives that can be followed
to improve or complete our work and provide new research directions.
This thesis highlights one of the major challenges of current industrial systems
namely ICS and Corporate systems integration security. The main objective was to
propose new approaches and models to ensure the security of Industrial Control systems
integrated with Information Systems against attacks.
First, we had to define a reference architecture to be the basis of our work. This
architecture would make it possible for us to focus on a single type of ICS architecture,
trying to study its security issues and provide some solutions. Studying all ICS archi-
tectures as part of a single project is not conceivable because they are very different
in terms of functionality, operation and infrastructure. Our reference architecture has
been defined in accordance with the standardized hierarchical functional model. We
defined examples of components at each functional level, and we also set up a commu-
nication flows table. This architecture has been, along with this thesis, the main basis
of our studies 2.
Next, we studied the state of the art of our problem. We particularly studied security
issues of industrial control systems and created a list of vulnerabilities targeting indus-
trial installations. We provided a summarized overview of ICS security problems, the
integration challenges and an analysis of countermeasures evaluating their maturity for
Integrated ICS systems. Multiple countermeasures have been suggested, however, the
integration remains very challenging as regards security. Most of the existing IICS secu-
rity solutions are IT solutions and are not really appropriate, as they are, for industrial
118 CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES
context. This is especially the case of Authentication and Authorization mechanisms,
Segmentation and Segregation, Firewalls and IDS/IPS.
Therefore, we decided to work on IICS segmentation and segregation. The results
of our work were presented in Chapter 4. We defined a new segmentation method
“SONICS”. It is an IICS segmentation method that aims at ensuring efficient zoning.
It is based on a meta-model that helps to model systems. System models are used by
the method to identify potential security zones. These are kept or dropped out based
on a constraints analysis.We designed and carried out a validation test to evaluate the
method. This helped us to identify the limitations and difficulties associated with the
method and to identify possible improvements. The first test results were acceptable.
However, we admit that the method’s application is not simple enough without using
the tool we developed. That said, our test method is by itself a standalone scientific
contribution that can be reused or adapted for other scientific works. SONICS has a
lot of advantages. It is a generic solution that can be applied to different types of IICS.
It keeps the focus only on aspects that are relevant for segmentation. It is a fairly
pragmatic method that takes into account IICS constraints and specificity. Note that
the method uses industrial systems concepts (Operation functional levels, IT and OT
technical types).
However, the security aspect of components was not adequately addressed in SON-
ICS. Only processes are segmented according to their risks. We have therefore decided
to make more use of the concept of risk in order for our method to take more security
aspects into account. We believe that the concept of components risk is one of the
best ways to characterize components from a security angle. The risk associated with
data, components or processes is based on the probability and gravity of the applicable
attacks.
Therefore, we proposed RIICS (Risk based IICS Segmentation), a new segmentation
method for IICS systems that fills the gaps of SONICS and tries to simplify security
zones identification by focusing on systems technical industrial specificities and risk.
The first results of our validation test were rather accurate. However, we still have many
more tests to do before we can confirm the effectiveness of the method. It is especially
necessary to apply the method to a variety of systems with different configuration and
various functional and business specificities. The cost of finding or creating test systems
remains, however, significantly high.
Segmentation is only about setting logical boundaries between security zones, and
is not enough to apply a security policy or to implement a defense in depth strategy.
Real physical boundaries have to be set up. This is achieved through segregation and
access controls techniques.
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Therefore, we designed a new DTE based access control model to address the issue
of access control of IICS. The new model reduces the complexity of using multiple
access control solutions by using a single centralized rule-setting language across all
the system. It also optimises the access controls processing time by applying them
locally on DTE enabled hosts and thus lightens the firewalls workload. This allows to
respect industrial timing requirements. Besides, using flexible objects definitions, new
protocols can be supported without extending the model.
We also proposed a generic security policy based on the generic functional model
provided by ISA95. This generic policy is intended to simplify the deployment of DTE
access control and provide a good introduction to the concepts of domains and types of
packets for managers. However, it remains extensible by creating new types, domains
and control rules.
Only the formal definition of the model was done. The next step of our study would
be to implement and test the proposed model in order to confirm its usefulness in the
context of ICS integration.
7.1 Perspectives
Our research works can be extended, completed and improved. Below are some potential
lines of inquiry that might help to complete our studies.
7.1.1 Segmentation methods validation
We developed generic segmentation methods. We managed to conduct some validation
tests using an existing segmented system. But, more testing is of course needed. Testing
these methods, however, requires a lot of resources and time. The methods should be
tested on multiple systems with different configurations and architectures. Although
testing on real systems is preferable, the use of simulated systems can be helpful as
long as the accuracy of their Ex-Segmentation is ensured. This would be a major task
for any further work.
7.1.2 Implement and test DTE access control
The DTE model should be implemented and tested. The implementation includes the
development of DTEL and control logic extensions, the mediation mechanism and the
decentralised management of the security policy.
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The preparation of an IICS test system that contains DTE and non-DTE com-
ponents and at least one DTE firewall is also required. Simulation techniques can be
used to create such a system. Validation tests must cover the requirements previously
presented. It would especially be required to validate the following requirements:
• Strict controls: Controls effectiveness should be tested. Specific attacks can be
designed in order to challenge the access control functions performed by DTE hosts
and firewalls, as well as access control for non DTE hosts.
• Respect the timing requirements: This is one of the most important things
to validate. Measures and statistics about the access controls latency should be
produced by performing a series of performance tests.
7.1.3 Extend our segregation solution with VPN
In this thesis we focused the DTE access control. This is not the only segregation so-
lution out there. It would be interesting to study the application of other segregation
solutions to IICS. For example, we could work on Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)
with strong multi-factor authentication. It would also be interesting to study the com-
bination of such a technique with our DTE model.
7.1.4 Work on other security techniques
In this thesis, we focused on the defence-in-depth technique and proposed methods and
models of segmentation and segregation. However, as explained in our state-of-the-art
study, other techniques such as IDSs and authentication mechanisms may need to be
redesigned to take into account industrial specificities. A potential long-term follow-up
of our works would be to study the integration of such solutions into the models we
proposed. For example, it would be interesting to use IDS alerts records as an input of
our segmentation method to recalculate the segmentation on a regular basis in order
to protect the system in a more sustainable way.
APPENDIX
A Résumé en français
Ce chapitre présente un résumé des trois années de travaux de recherche effectués dans
le cadre de cette thèse. Nous présentons le contexte et les motivations, ainsi que les
problèmes que nous avons étudiés et finalement les principales contributions réalisées.
A.1 Introduction
Le monde industriel a de plus en plus un réel besoin d’intégrer les systèmes de contrôle
industriel (ICS) aux systèmes d’entreprise. L’intégration de ces deux systèmes présente
de nombreux avantages tels qu’une visibilité améliorée des activités industrielles, une
capacité d’utiliser les techniques de Business Intelligence pour optimiser les processus
de production et acquérir une plus grande réactivité aux exigences et aux décisions
Business pour atteindre une plus grande compétitivité commerciale.
Cependant, cette intégration engendre de multiples problèmes de sécurité. En effet,
les systèmes industriels ont été conçus sans aucune sécurité, car ils étaient générale-
ment isolés. L’utilisation de protocoles et de technologies peu sécurisés et l’absence de
politiques et de formation des ressources humaines sur les pratiques de cyber sécurité
sont des exemples de problèmes de sécurité des systèmes industriels.
Par conséquent, l’intégration expose à la fois les ICS et les systèmes d’entreprise à
des menaces majeures. Malheureusement, les pratiques connues en matière de sécurité
des IT ne peuvent être appliquées directement aux systèmes ICS parce que les deux
types de systèmes sont différents par nature et ont des exigences fonctionnelles et de
sécurité différentes.
La sécurisation des systèmes industriels, et en particulier des systèmes intégrés,
devient l’une des préoccupations les plus urgentes qui inquiètent non seulement tous
les acteurs industriels mais les gouvernements aussi. Un nombre très important d’entités
industrielles et d’infrastructures sont si critiques que toute cyber attaque réussie contre
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ces entités peut causer d’énormes dégâts aux entreprises, à l’environnement et plus
gravement à la sécurité nationale et à la sûreté des personnes.
Cette thèse étudie l’intégration des systèmes ICS avec les systèmes d’entreprise
d’un point de vue sécurité. Notre objectif est d’étudier les vulnérabilités de sécurité
des systèmes industriels intégrés et de proposer des modèles et des mécanismes pour
améliorer leur sécurité et les protéger contre les attaques complexes.
A.2 Les Contributions
La première partie de notre travail a consisté à réaliser une étude sur les vulnérabilités
des systèmes ICS intégrés (IICS) ainsi que les contre-mesures et solutions de sécurité
existantes. Nous avons mis en place une architecture de référence des systèmes intégrés
des ICS pour servir de base à notre travail et nous aider à identifier plus précisément
les vulnérabilités et étudier les mécanismes et modèles de sécurité proposés.
La Défense en profondeur est l’une des techniques de sécurité les plus importantes
qui sont fortement recommandées pour les systèmes ICS intégrés. Malheureusement,
aucune méthode expliquant sa mise en œuvre pour les IICS n’existe. La défense en
profondeur est principalement implémentée à l’aide de la segmentation et de la ségré-
gation. La segmentation consiste à segmenter un système en plusieurs zones de sécurité
qui peuvent être contrôlées, surveillées et protégées séparément. La ségrégation con-
siste à contrôler la communication à travers les frontières des segments sur la base d’un
ensemble de règles prédéfinies. La segmentation d’un IICS peut être fondée sur divers
types de caractéristiques telles que les caractéristiques fonctionnelles, l’impact com-
mercial, les niveaux de risque ou d’autres exigences définies par l’organisation. Bien
que de nombreux travaux de recherche aient suggéré des solutions de segmentation,
ces solutions ne sont malheureusement pas suffisamment génériques et ne prennent pas
suffisamment en compte les spécificités des IICS, comme leur hétérogénéité technique
et fonctionnelle, leurs contraintes et leurs conditions industrielles réelles. Les carac-
téristiques des éléments du système à prendre en compte pour la segmentation ne sont
pas non plus évidentes.
Nous avons donc défini une nouvelle méthode générique de segmentation pour les
IICS, “SONICS”, qui permet de simplifier la segmentation des IICS. Cette nouvelle
méthode est basée sur un méta-modèle simple définissant les systèmes IICS qui permet
de décrire des éléments de systèmes en se concentrant uniquement sur les aspects qui
sont réellement significatifs pour la segmentation. Certains aspects du méta-modèle
nécessitent la réalisation d’une analyse de risque pour décrire plus précisément le sys-
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tème. La méthode elle-même consiste en de multiples cycles où de nouveaux segments
potentiels sont progressivement identifiés en fonction d’un aspect du méta-modèle à la
fois. Les nouvelles zones identifiées sont conservées ou non en fonction d’une analyse
des contraintes réalisée sur les éléments IICS impliqués dans les nouvelles zones poten-
tielles. L’analyse des contraintes permet de vérifier que la création d’une nouvelle zone
identifiée ne conduit pas à une violation des exigences fonctionnelles du système, ni à
un dépassement des coûts techniques. Préserver une zone identifiée est une décision à
prendre en comparant la Nécessité de cette nouvelle zone aux contraintes connues sur
ces éléments. Nous avons défini un système de classement composé de deux échelles
(échelle des niveaux de Nécessité et échelle des niveaux de Contraintes) pour aider à
évaluer et comparer les niveaux de Nécessité et de Contraintes liés à une zone identi-
fiée et ensuite décider si cette zone doit être maintenue ou pas. [Khaoula et al. 2017,
Khaoula et al. 2018b]
L’étape suivante a consisté à étendre la méthode à d’autres aspects de la sécu-
rité. Nous sommes convaincus que le concept de risque des composants est l’une des
meilleures façons de caractériser les composants d’un point de vue sécurité. Nous avons
donc créé RIICS (Risk based IICS Segmentation), une nouvelle méthode de segmen-
tation pour les systèmes IICS qui comble les lacunes de SONICS et tente de simplifier
l’identification des zones de sécurité en se concentrant sur les spécificités techniques
des IICS et des risques auxquels ils sont exposés. Le risque associé aux données, aux
composants ou aux processus est évalué à l’aide d’une version légèrement adaptée de
la méthode d’évaluation des risques EBIOS pour laquelle le risque est basé sur la prob-
abilité et la gravité des scénarios de menace possibles.[Khaoula et al. 2018a]
Par ailleurs, la défense en profondeur ne peut pas seulement être réalisée par la
segmentation. L’identification des zones de sécurité est nécessaire mais insuffisante.
Les flux de communication sortant ou entrant dans une zone doivent être filtrés. Nous
sommes donc convaincus que notre méthode de segmentation doit être complétée par
une méthode de ségrégation.
Pour compléter la méthode de segmentation, nous avons étudié les solutions de sé-
grégation. Le problème de l’intégration des ICS représente un nouveau cas d’utilisation
en termes de mécanismes de filtrage des flux. Lors de l’intégration des deux systèmes,
il est nécessaire de:
• Appliquer des contrôles stricts sur tous les flux, et en particulier sur la communi-
cation entre des réseaux différents.
• Respecter les exigences temporelles des systèmes industriels.
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• Permettre de personnaliser l’inspection des paquets pour étendre les protocoles
pris en charge. Cela permettra notamment de supporter davantage de protocoles
industriels.
• Simplifier la définition des règles de contrôle pour faciliter la tâche des administra-
teurs, en particulier les administrateurs de systèmes industriels car ils sont moins
familiers avec les mesures de sécurité.
Nous avons décidé d’étudier l’utilisation du contrôle d’accès DTE (Domain and
Type Enfoncement) pour la ségrégation ICS intégrée. Le DTE est un mécanisme de
contrôle d’accès qui offre la souplesse nécessaire pour répondre aux exigences présen-
tées ci-dessus. Nous avons étendu le modèle initial de DTE et l’avons formalisé pour
définir un nouveau modèle de contrôle des flux pour les systèmes ICS intégrés. Nous
avons proposé une politique de contrôle d’accès générique mais extensible basée sur le
modèle fonctionnel générique fourni par la norme ISA95. Cette politique générique vise
à simplifier le déploiement du contrôle d’accès DTE et à fournir une bonne introduction
aux concepts DTE.
A.3 SONICS: Une nouvelle méthode de segmenta-
tion
Plusieurs travaux de recherche ont étudié la segmentation des IICS. Pour la plupart
d’entre eux, la segmentation doit se faire au cas par cas sans fournir plus d’explication
sur comment la faire. D’autres ont une approche orientée par l’exemple et essaient
d’effectuer une segmentation sur une architecture de référence bien définie. Ils recom-
mandent d’adopter le cadre logique du modèle Purdue pour la hiérarchie de contrôle
(CEI 62264) pour délimiter les zones de sécurité.
D’autres travaux de recherche proposent une solution générique au problème. Ils
fournissent des règles et des instructions génériques pour identifier les zones de sécurité
tout en adoptant le modèle hiérarchique de la norme CEI 62264 (ISA95). Nous croyons
que cette approche peut mener à d’excellents résultats si elle est menée en mettant
l’accent sur les aspects les plus pertinents pour la segmentation IICS. C’est pourquoi
nous proposons SONICS, une nouvelle méthode générique de segmentation IICS qui
vise à simplifier l’identification des zones de sécurité IICS en se concentrant sur des
aspects pertinents pour la segmentation en tenant compte des spécificités industrielles.
Cette méthode utilise un méta-modèle simple pour décrire les systèmes IICS et permet
d’identifier les zones de sécurité potentielles à travers plusieurs étapes. Les nouvelles
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zones potentielles identifiées sont conservées ou non sur la base d’une analyse de con-
traintes.
A.3.1 SONICS: Le principe
Figure A.1 – Etapes de la méthode de segmentation SONICS
Avec SONICS, la segmentation se fait en deux phases. La première phase consiste à
modéliser le système à segmenter à l’aide du méta-modèle (Figure A.3). Le modèle du
système est le principal input de la deuxième phase. Cette dernière consiste à segmenter
le système à travers six cycles comme illustré sur la Figure A.1. Au premier cycle, les
frontières du système sont protégées. C’est la première zone de sécurité du système.
Ensuite, les composants du système sont groupés cycle après cycle en fonction d’un seul
aspect (fonctionnel, technique, géographique, de processus, et le risque de connexions
interzones) par cycle pour constituer des zones de sécurité potentielles. [Khaoula et al.
2017]
Plus de détails sur le groupement des composants sont fournies ci-dessous. Les
zones de sécurité identifiées à chaque cycle, sont conservées en fonction d’une analyse
de contraintes réalisée sur les composants impliqués dans les nouvelles zones identifiées
(Figure A.2).
A.3.2 SONICS: Le méta-modèle
Notre méta-modèle IICS (Figure A.3) permet de modéliser un IICS comme un ensemble
de Composants, Connections et Process.
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Figure A.2 – Cycle de segmentation
Figure A.3 – Méta-modèle SONICS
Les composants sont caractérisés par leur niveau fonctionnel du modèle CEI 62264
(ISA 95), leur type technique et leur géo-localisation.
Les composants sont connectés par des connexions. Une “Connexion” est un canal
qui peut être utilisé par deux (ou plusieurs) composants pour communiquer entre eux.
Il peut être physique, où les Composants sont directement liés par une connexion
physique (filaire ou sans fil), ou logique, où les Composants sont liés par une succes-
sion de Connexions physiques. Une connexion peut être caractérisée par son niveau
de risque, la segmentation de l’impact de la connexion, en particulier lorsqu’elle re-
lie des composants de différentes zones. C’est pourquoi nous accordons une attention
particulière aux Connections inter-zones. En effet, les “connexions inter-zones” peu-
vent connecter deux zones de deux niveaux de sécurité différents ou qui contiennent
des composants de niveaux de risque différents. Cela pourrait introduire des problèmes
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de sécurité. Le niveau de risque de chaque connexion inter-zone du système doit être
évalué sur la base d’une analyse de risque des connexions et des composants qu’elles
connectent. Pour évaluer le risque des connexions inter-zones, nous utilisons une version
minimaliste de la méthode d’analyse de risques EBIOS. Pour une connexion inter-zone
donnée, tous les Services exposés par les Composants des zones qu’elle connecte ainsi
que toutes les Données manipulées doivent être analysées afin de réaliser une évaluation
qualitative plus précise du risque associé à ces composantes.
Les process (les procédés métier ou industriels) sont des ensembles d’activités in-
terdépendantes qui transforment des inputs en outputs. Un système est structuré en
plusieurs processus. Chaque composant appartient à un ou plusieurs processus. Un
process se caractérise par son “niveau de protection requis” et représente une zone de
sécurité potentielle. Le “niveau de protection requis” est calculé en fonction de son
niveau de risque qui est évalué à l’aide d’une analyse de risque.
A.3.3 Outil de segmentation
Nous avons développé un outil qui implémente notre méthode (Figure A.4). Cet outil
permet de créer des modèles de systèmes et d’exécuter les étapes de segmentation
dessus pour obtenir des systèmes segmentés. La création d’un modèle nécessite de
bonnes connaissances et une préparation préalable. Il est nécessaire que l’utilisateur de
l’outil connaisse suffisamment bien l’architecture du système, ses processus, ses risques
et ses contraintes. La modélisation du système consiste, comme le montre la Figure
A.4, à créer des composants, spécifier leurs caractéristiques et ajouter des connexions
et des processus.
Une fois le modèle créé, l’outil permet de dérouler les étapes de la méthode l’une
après l’autre en permettant d’attribuer des niveaux de contraintes aux connexions
inter-zones. Par exemple, pour la première étape de segmentation, à savoir la segmen-
tation fonctionnelle, les outils calculent les nouvelles zones potentielles du cycle (en
les différenciant par des couleurs différentes) comme l’illustre la Figure 4.6. Il décrit
les connexions inter-zones de ces zones potentielles permettant de définir leurs niveaux
de contraintes (Figure 4.7). Les zones de sécurité sont ensuite recalculées en fonction
des valeurs des niveaux de contraintes nouvellement définies. Les cycles suivants sont
traités de la même manière (en appuyant sur le bouton “Next Step”) jusqu’à l’obtention
du résultat final.
De plus, l’outil est complètement récursif. Toute valeur fixée par l’utilisateur, qu’il
s’agisse d’une caractéristique d’un composant, d’une connexion ou d’un processus, est
incluse dans le modèle du système et réutilisée à travers les différentes étapes. Par
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Figure A.4 – Outil de segmentation - capture 1
Figure A.5 – Outil de segmentation - capture 2
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exemple, si le niveau de contrainte d’une connexion est défini pendant un cycle, il n’a
pas besoin d’être réinitialisé à d’autres cycles car il devient une caractéristique de cette
connexion. Ceci assure que le résultat de la segmentation est automatiquement recalculé
chaque fois que le modèle du système évolue en ajoutant, modifiant ou supprimant des
composants, des connexions ou des process.
A.3.4 Méthodologie de test
Figure A.6 – Méthodologie de test
Nous avons conçu une méthode de test et de validation afin d’évaluer notre méthode
de segmentation SONICS. Cette méthode de test est basée sur la comparaison du
résultat de SONICS à des segmentations qui sont faites au fil du temps par expertise.
Nous nous référons à ces segmentations de références par “Ex-Segmentation” et nous les
supposons correctes. Etant donné un système de test avec une segmentation existante
(une “Ex-Segmentation”), le test de validation consiste à appliquer SONICS sur ce
système et à comparer les résultats avec la “Ex-Segmentation” comme expliqué sur la
Figure A.6.
La comparaison du résultat de SONICS se base sur le concept d’efficacité et de
précision de la segmentation. Nous définissons l’efficacité d’une méthode sur un en-
semble de systèmes de test comme la moyenne de l’exactitude des résultats obtenus
pour chaque système. La précision d’un résultat dépend de la mesure dans laquelle le
résultat est similaire à celui attendu. Dans notre cas, la précision du résultat d’une
segmentation est fonction de la distance entre la segmentation obtenue par SONICS et
la Ex-Segmentation. La distance entre deux segmentations d’un même système est le
coût minimum pour transformer une segmentation en l’autre en effectuant un ensemble
des seules actions suivantes :
• Déplacer un seul composant à la fois d’un segment à l’autre
• Enlever un segment
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• Fusionner deux segments
La précision est calculée en fonction de la distance à l’aide de la formule suivante :
accuracy = 11 + distance
Les premiers résultats des tests étaient acceptables. Cependant, nous admettons que
l’application de la méthode n’est pas assez simple sans utiliser l’outil que nous avons
développé. Cela dit, notre méthode de test est en soi une contribution scientifique qui
peut être réutilisée ou adaptée pour d’autres travaux scientifiques.
A.4 RIICS: Une méthode de segmentation basée
sur le risque
La méthode SONICS tente de prendre en compte les aspects les plus importants de la
segmentation IICS selon de multiples standards de sécurité. Les spécificités techniques
et fonctionnelles sont bien couvertes par la méthode via les caractéristiques des com-
posants ainsi que les contraintes techniques et fonctionnelles. Cela permet de s’assurer
que les composants de natures techniques ou fonctionnelles différentes sont séparés, à
moins qu’il n’y ait des contraintes qui l’en empêchent. La méthode consiste également
à séparer les composants qui appartiennent à des sites distants différents afin de se con-
former aux recommandations de sécurité communes. Cependant, l’aspect sécurité des
composants n’est pas suffisamment pris en compte. Seuls les processus sont segmentés
en fonction de leurs risques. Nous avons donc décidé d’utiliser davantage la notion de
risque afin que notre méthode prenne davantage en compte les aspects de sécurité.
Nous croyons que le concept de risque des composants est l’une des meilleures façons
de caractériser les composants du point de vue de la sécurité. Le risque associé aux
données, composants ou processus est basé sur la probabilité et la gravité des attaques
applicables. L’analyse des risques nécessite une forte concentration sur l’étude du con-
texte et implique la mise en œuvre de mesures rationnelles et optimales, notamment
en termes de coûts.
Nous avons donc conçu une nouvelle méthode de segmentation RIICS (Risk based
IICS Segmentation), qui vise à combler les lacunes de la méthode SONICS pour
garantir des résultats plus précis qui répondent aux besoins réels de sécurité de l’IICS.
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Elle repose sur une analyse des risques qui permet d’évaluer le risque des composants.
Les modèles de systèmes sont utilisés par la méthode pour délimiter les zones de sécurité
en regroupant des composants ayant les mêmes caractéristiques.
Figure A.7 – Les étapes de la méthode de segmentation RIICS
Tout comme SONICS, la segmentation se fait en deux phases. Tout d’abord, le
système est analysé et modélisé pour créer le modèle du système qui représente l’entrée
principale de la phase de segmentation. La modélisation du système est basée sur un
méta-modèle plus complet qui inclut des éléments qui mettent en avant la notion de
risque. Un modèle se concentre principalement sur les composants des systèmes et
leurs inter-connexions. L’analyse de risque permet d’évaluer et d’attribuer les niveaux
de risque aux composants du système. L’opération de segmentation consiste ensuite
à grouper les composants du système selon leur géo-localisation, leur type technique
et leur niveau de risque en trois cycles (Figure A.7). En termes simples, des com-
posants ayant la même géo-localisation, le même type technique et le même niveau de
risque constituent ensemble une seule zone de sécurité. L’évaluation des risques des
composants est réalisée avec la méthode d’analyse de risque EBIOS.
Nous avons testé la méthode RIICS en utilisant la même méthodologie de test
présentée précédemment. Les premiers résultats ont été positifs. Cependant, il nous
reste encore beaucoup de tests à faire avant de pouvoir confirmer l’efficacité de la
méthode. Il est particulièrement nécessaire d’appliquer la méthode à une variété de
systèmes de configurations différentes et de spécificités fonctionnelles et techniques
variées.
A noter que RIICS, tout comme SONICS, est également applicable aux systèmes
d’information (sans aucun système industriel), car elle est générique et parce que les
SI sont des sous-systèmes des IICS.
Nous convenons, toutefois, que l’analyse de risque exige un certain niveau
d’expertise, mais la phase de segmentation est très simple.
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A.5 Modèle de contrôle d’accès DTE
Les technologies de contrôle d’accès traditionnelles telles que les pare-feux sont très
importantes pour les systèmes ICS intégrés afin de contrôler les communications entre
les différents réseaux et de protéger les ressources importantes. Cependant, les pare-
feux conventionnels ne sont pas toujours entièrement compatibles avec les systèmes de
contrôle industriel. En effet, les pare-feux peuvent introduire une latence importante
alors que les systèmes ICS sont généralement très exigeants en termes de temps de
réponse. De plus, la plupart des pare-feux existants ne supportent pas tous les proto-
coles industriels.
Nous sommes convaincus qu’un mécanisme de contrôle d’accès fondamentalement
plus adapté est nécessaire pour contrôler les flux au sein de l’IICS en ce qui concerne
les exigences des systèmes. Le nouveau mécanisme de contrôle d’accès doit :
• Appliquer des contrôles stricts sur tous les flux, et en particulier sur la communi-
cation entre des réseaux différents.
• Respecter les exigences temporelles des systèmes industriels.
• Permettre de personnaliser l’inspection des paquets pour étendre les protocoles
pris en charge. Cela permettra notamment de supporter davantage de protocoles
industriels.
• Simplifier la définition des règles de contrôle pour faciliter la tâche des administra-
teurs, en particulier les administrateurs de systèmes industriels car ils sont moins
familiers avec les mesures de sécurité.
Domain and Type Enforcement (DTE) est un mécanisme de contrôle d’accès
prometteur qui permettrait de fournir la flexibilité et le renforcement nécessaires tout
en appliquant les contrôles d’accès. Des études ont été menées sur l’utilisation des tech-
niques de DTE dans les systèmes IICS. Bien que leurs conclusions soient intéressantes,
elles se limitent à la sécurisation des flux d’intégration entre le ICS et le système
d’entreprise. Notre objectif est de généraliser les contrôles de DTE à l’ensemble du
système en fournissant un modèle générique qui fournit des concepts simples et co-
hérents permettant de définir des règles de contrôle d’une manière simple et homogène
à travers le système. Ce nouveau modèle permet de définir et d’appliquer des contrôles
d’accès renforcés dans le respect des exigences temporelles des ICS. La définition des
contrôles d’accès est basée sur un langage de haut niveau qui peut être utilisé facile-
ment par les administrateurs ICS. Nous proposons également un premier ensemble de
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règles génériques basées sur le modèle fonctionnel de la norme ISA95. Ce jeu de règles
génériques simplifie le déploiement des contrôles d’accès DTE et constitue une bonne
introduction aux concepts DTE pour les administrateurs.
A.5.1 Le modèle DTE
Nous avons créé un modèle générique de contrôle d’accès basé sur DTE. Ce nouveau
modèle répond aux quatre exigences que nous avons présentées précédemment. Nous
avons également créé une extension du langage DTEL pour représenter les nouveaux
concepts introduits par notre modèle tout en restant compatible avec la version stan-
dard de DTEL. Les domaines, objets et permissions sont définis en utilisant presque la
même syntaxe que le langage DTE avec quelques nouvelles fonctionnalités.
Notre modèle est une extension du modèle DTE de base et permet de modéliser
les process qui s’exécutent sur le système comme des entités. Celles-ci peuvent être
groupées en des services. Un service est un ensemble de processus qui sont régis par
les mêmes règles de contrôle d’accès. La vue service permet de faire abstraction des
processus et de définir des règles de contrôle d’accès transverses communes. Pourvu que
les processus sont définis, les services sont plus faciles à gérer pour les administrateurs
de systèmes ayant des connaissances limitées en informatique et en sécurité.
Quant aux objets, ce sont les paquets qui sont transmis entre les entités. Un objet
peut être défini comme un ensemble d’attributs basés sur l’emplacement des champs
dans le paquet. Les attributs des objets sont, par exemple, l’adresse IP source ou
destination, le port source ou destination, les données de la couche application.... Cela
permet de définir des objets de différents protocoles sans avoir à étendre le modèle de
contrôle d’accès.
Un exemple de définition d’objet est < (< 36, 2 >, 80) >. Cela représente un paquet
dont la valeur du champs à la position 36 octets et d’une taille de 2 octets est égal à
80. Cette définition représente tous les paquets avec un port de destination égal à 80.
Il s’agit généralement d’une requête à destination d’un serveur web.
Les objets sont typés et le entités sont associées à des domaines. Des règles peuvent
être définie pour autoriser des domaines à exécuter des actions (comme l’envoi et la
réception) sur des types d’objets. L’ensemble des définition et des règles constituent la
politique de sécurité.
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A.5.2 Mode opératoire
Le contrôle d’accès local
Les contrôles d’accès DTE sont réalisés localement sur les composants lorsque cela est
possible. Sur les hôtes DTE, le contrôle d’accès est appliqué chaque fois qu’un paquet
est envoyé ou reçu par un processus exécuté sur l’hôte DTE. Lorsqu’un paquet est
envoyé, les règles définies concernant le domaine d’envoi sont vérifiées. Pour ce faire,
toutes les règles qui s’appliquent au processus qui envoie le paquet seront vérifiées. Pour
chaque règle, le paquet est comparé au type d’objet de la règle essayant de renvoyer une
seule règle au maximum. Si une règle d’autorisation d’action d’envoi correspondant au
type d’objet est trouvée, le paquet peut être envoyé, sinon il est refusé.
Il n’est donc plus nécessaire de traiter tous les paquets sur le pare-feu. Cela permet
de définir des règles de contrôle beaucoup plus fines sans se soucier des performances
car le traffic sur les composants est beaucoup moins important que sur les firewalls.
La médiation
L’avantage de DTE est qu’il fournisse des mécanismes de rétrocompatibilité avec les
composants qui n’implémentent pas DTE.
La médiation est un mécanisme qui permet d’associer des domaines DTE à des
entités exécutées sur des machines non-DTE. Il utilise les en-têtes de paquets pour
déterminer le type DTE du paquet et le domaine DTE auquel appartient l’entité émet-
trice ou réceptrice.
Firewall access controls
Les pare-feux DTE sont déployés aux limites des segments et sont chargés de s’assurer
que les contrôles d’accès sont correctement effectués par les hôtes DTE. Les commu-
nications provenant de l’extérieur d’un segment ne sont par défaut pas autorisées et
doivent être explicitement autorisées. Les pare-feux DTE sont également responsables
de la médiation entre les hôtes DTE et non DTE.
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A.6 Application du modèle DTE aux IICS
Notre modèle de contrôle d’accès décompose le système en plusieurs domaines logiques
qui incluent les différentes entités. La définition des domaines et des règles de contrôle
doit être définie au cas par cas en fonction du système, mais une grande partie des
politiques de contrôle d’accès est totalement générique et peut être appliquée à tous
les IICS. Cette partie générique est basée sur le modèle d’intégration fonctionnel défini
par la norme ISA 99 qui définit les fonctions d’une entreprise impliquée dans la fab-
rication ainsi que les flux d’information entre les fonctions qui traversent l’interface
entreprise/ICS.
Figure A.8 – Modèle fonctionnel ISA95
Le modèle fonctionnel représente l’IICS comme un ensemble de fonctions, d’entités
externes et de flux de communication entre elles. Il est illustré par la figure A.8.
Nous utiliserons le modèle fonctionnel générique pour créer une politique de sécurité
DTE partielle générique. Les fonctions de la Figure A.8 représentent les domaines DTE,
et les flux entre les fonctions représentent les flux à contrôler et les types d’objets.
La politique générique que nous proposons a pour but de simplifier le déploiement du
contrôle d’accès DTE et de fournir une bonne introduction aux concepts de domaines et
de types de paquets pour les administrateurs. Cependant, elle reste, bien évidemment,
extensible. La création de nouveaux types, domaines et règles de contrôle sera possible
globalement et localement.
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A.7 Conclusion
Cette thèse étudie l’une des problématiques majeures des systèmes industriels actuels,
à savoir la sécurisation des systèmes ICS intégrés. L’objectif principal était de proposer
de nouvelles approches et de nouveaux modèles pour assurer la sécurité de ces systèmes.
Nous avons travaillé sur la segmentation et la ségrégation des IICS. Nous avons
défini une nouvelle méthode de segmentation “SONICS”. Il s’agit d’une méthode de
segmentation IICS qui a pour but d’assurer une segmentation efficace. Nous avons
conçu et réalisé un test de validation pour évaluer la méthode. Cela nous a permis
d’identifier les limites et les difficultés liées à la méthode et d’identifier les amélio-
rations possibles. Les premiers résultats de tests étaient acceptables. Cependant, nous
reconnaissons que l’application de la méthode n’est pas assez simple sans utiliser l’outil
que nous avons développé.
Cependant, l’aspect sécurité des composants n’a pas été traité de manière adéquate
dans SONICS. C’est pourquoi nous avons développé RIICS (Risk based IICS Segmen-
tation), une nouvelle méthode de segmentation pour les systèmes IICS qui comble les
manques de SONICS en mettant en avant les spécificités techniques et industrielles
des systèmes et leurs risques. Les premiers résultats de notre test de validation ont été
positifs. Cependant, il nous reste encore beaucoup de tests à faire avant de pouvoir
confirmer l’efficacité de la méthode. Il est particulièrement nécessaire d’appliquer la
méthode à une variété de systèmes de configurations différentes et de spécificités fonc-
tionnelles et industrielles variées. Le coût de la recherche ou de la création de systèmes
de test reste toutefois très élevé.
Pour compléter la méthode de segmentation, nous avons développé un nouveau
modèle de contrôle d’accès à base de DTE. Le nouveau modèle réduirait la complexité
de l’utilisation de plusieurs solutions de contrôle d’accès en utilisant un seul langage cen-
tralisé d’établissement de règles dans tout le système. Il permet également d’optimiser
le temps de traitement des contrôles d’accès en les appliquant localement sur les hôtes
DTE et d’alléger ainsi la charge des pare-feux. Cela permet de respecter les exigences
temporelles industrielles. De plus, en utilisant des définitions d’objets flexibles, de nou-
veaux protocoles peuvent être supportés sans que le modèle ait besoin d’être étendu.
Seule la définition formelle du modèle a été réalisée. L’étape suivante de notre étude
consisterait à mettre en œuvre et à tester le modèle proposé afin de confirmer son
utilité dans le contexte de l’intégration du ICS.
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Glossary
Authentication is the process of validating the identity of a third party before al-
lowing access to the protected resource. i
Authorization is the process of validating that the authenticated user has been
granted permission to access the requested resources. i
Commercial Off The Shell (COTS) is a term that references non-developmental
items (NDI) sold in the commercial marketplace and used or obtained through
government contracts. The set of rules for COTS is defined by the Federal Ac-
quisition Regulation (FAR). A COTS product is usually a computer hardware or
software product tailored for specific uses and made available to the general public.
Such products are designed to be readily available and user friendlyl. i, 147
Corporate system is a group of “Enterprise data centric” components, connected
together in a particular area, which are all owned by the same company or insti-
tutions and which cover and support corporate functions. i
Customer Relationship Management (CRM) The Customer Relationship Man-
agement is a type of business software for capturing, processing and analyzing
information on customers and prospects in order to retain them by providing op-
timized services. i, 147
Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) is a set of Microsoft concepts
and program interfaces in which client program object s can request services from
server program objects on other computers in a network. DCOM is based on the
Component Object Model (COM), which provides a set of interfaces allowing
clients and servers to communicate within the same computer. It’s used for OPC,
uses RPC which opens multiple ports to establish communication. i, 147
144 Glossary
Distributed Network Protocol (DNP3) is a set of communications protocols used
between components in process automation systems. Its main use is in utilities such
as electric and water companies. i, 147
Distribution Management System (DMS) A Distribution Management System
is a collection of applications to monitor and control the entire distribution network
in a safe and efficient way. It also serves as an operations platform, automating
tasks and filtering information for the operator. DMSs use real-time data and
provide all information on a single console at the control centre in an integrated
way. i, 147
Encryption Data encryption is a security method where information is encoded and
can only be accessed or decrypted by a user with the correct encryption key. i
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) is a category of business-management soft-
ware i.e., typically a suite of integrated applications that an organization can use
to collect, store, manage and interpret data from many business activities. i, 147
Ethernet Ethernet is the traditional technology for connecting wired local area net-
works (LANs), enabling devices to communicate with each other via a protocol –
a set of rules or common network language. i
Firmware In a computer system, a firmware is a program integrated into computer
hardware (computer, photocopier, PLC, APS, hard disk, router, digital camera,
etc.) that allows it to operate. i
Global System for Mobile communication (GSM) is a digital mobile network
that is widely used by mobile phone users in Europe and other parts of the world.
GSM uses a variation of time division multiple access (TDMA) and is the most
widely used of the three digital wireless telephony technologies: TDMA, GSM and
code-division multiple access (CDMA). GSM digitizes and compresses data, then
sends it down a channel with two other streams of user data, each in its own time
slot. i, 147
Industrial Control System (ICS) is a general term that encompasses several types
of control systems used in industrial production, including Supervisory Control
And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, Distributed Control Systems (DCS), and
other control system configurations often found in industrial sectors and critical
infrastructures. i, 148
Glossary 145
Internet of Things (IoT) is a computing concept that describes the idea of every-
day physical objects being connected to the internet and being able to identify
themselves to other devices. i, 148
Local Area Network (LAN) is a computer network that interconnects computers
within a limited area such as a residence, school, laboratory, university campus or
office building. i, 148
Manufacturing Execution System (MES) Manufacturing Execution System (or
MOM - Manufacturing Operations Management), is a computerized system used
in manufacturing, to track and document a manufacturing process. The aim of an
MES is to make the value-adding processes transparent. i, 148
Meter Data Management (MDM) Meter Data Management is a software system
that performs long-term storage, management and processing for the great amount
of data delivered by smart metering systems. i, 148
Modbus Modbus is a serial communications protocol originally published by Modicon
(now Schneider Electric) in 1979 for use with its programmable logic controllers
(PLCs). Modbus has become a de facto standard communication protocol and is
now a commonly available means of connecting industrial electronic devices. i
OLE for Process Control (OPC) It is a software interface standard that allows
Windows programs to communicate with industrial hardware devices. OPC is
implemented in server/client pairs. i, 148
OPC Classic is a software interface standard that allows Windows programs to com-
municate with industrial hardware devices. OPC is implemented in server/client
pairs. i
Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) are digital devices used for automation
of industrial electro-mechanical processes. They connect to sensors in the process
and convert their signals to digital data. i, 148
Remote Procedure Call (RPC) is a protocol that one program can use to request
a service from a program located in another computer on a network without having
to understand the network’s details. A procedure call is also sometimes known as
a function call or a subroutine call. i, 148
Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) are microprocessor-controlled electronic devices
that interface sensors and actuators by transmitting telemetry data to the SCADA
146 Glossary
Server, and by using messages from the master supervisory system to control con-
nected objects. i, 148
Security policy A security policy specifies security requirements through permis-
sions, prohibitions and obligations.. i
Segmentation the operation of dividing a system into multiple security zones that
can be separately controlled, monitored and protected. i
Segregation the operation of controlling communication through the security zones
boundaries based on a set of predefined rules. i
Serial cable is a cable used to transfer information between two devices using a serial
communication protocol. The form of connectors depends on the particular serial
port used.. i
Software as a Service (SaaS) is a software distribution model in which a third-
party provider hosts applications and makes them available to customers over
the Internet. SaaS is one of three main categories of cloud computing, alongside
infrastructure as a service (IaaS) and platform as a service (PaaS). i, 148
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) It integrates data acqui-
sition systems with data transmission systems and HMI software to provide a
centralized monitoring and control system for multiple process inputs and out-
puts. They are designed to collect field data, transfer them to central computer
facility, and display information to the operator graphically or textually. This al-
lows the operator to monitor or control an entire system from a central location
in near real time. Supervisory control layer contains the top level components of
SCADA to which we refer as control centers. i, 148
Wide Area Network (WAN) is a network that exists over a large-scale geographi-
cal area. i, 149
Acronymes
ARP Address Resolution Protocol. i
CAE Computer Aided Engineering. i
COTS Commercial Off The Shell. i, 147, See: Commercial Off The Shell
CRM Customer Relationship Management. i, 147, See: Customer Relationship Man-
agement
DCOM Distributed Component Object Model. i, 147, See: Distributed Component
Object Model
DDT Domain Definition Table. i
DIT Domain Interaction Table. i
DMS Distribution Management System. i, 147, See: Distribution Management System
DNP3 Distributed Network Protocol. i, 147, See: Distributed Network Protocol
DTE Domain Type Enforcement. i
DTEL DTE Language. i
EBIOS Expression des Besoins et Identification des Objectifs de Sécurité. i
ERP Enterprise Resource Planning. i, 147, See: Enterprise Resource Planning
FTP File Transfer Protocol. i
GSM Global System for Mobile communication. i, 147, See: Global System for Mobile
communication
GUI Graphical User Interface. i
148 Acronyms
ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol. i
ICS Industrial Control System. i, 1, 148, See: Industrial Control System
IDS Intrusion Detection System. i
IED Intelligent Electronic Devices. i
IGMP Internet Group Management Protocol. i
IoT Internet of Things. i, 148, See: Internet of Things
IP Internet Protocol. i
IPS Intrusion Prevention System. i
ISD Information Systems Department. i
IT Information Technologies. i
LAN Local Area Network. i, 148, See: Local Area Network
MDM Meter Data Management. i, 148, See: Meter Data Management
MES Manufacturing Execution System. i, 148, See: Manufacturing Execution System
OPC OLE for Process Control. i, 148, See: OLE for Process Control
OT Operation Technologies. i
PLC Programmable Logic Controller. i, 148, See: Programmable Logic Controller
RBAC Role Based Access Control. i
RIICS Risk based IICS Segmentation. i
RPC Remote Procedure Call. i, 148, See: Remote Procedure Call
RTU Remote Terminal Unit. i, 148, See: Remote Terminal Unit
SaaS Software as a Service. i, 148, See: Software as a Service
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition. i, 148, See: Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition
SCTP Stream Control Transmission Protocol. i
Acronyms 149
SMTP Simple Mail Transfer Protocol. i
SONICS Segmentation On iNtegrated ICS system. i
SQL Structured Query Language. i
TCP Transmission Control Protocol. i
USB Universal Serial Bus. i
WAN Wide Area Network. i, 149, See: Wide Area Network
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Titre : Mécanismes et modèles de segmentation et de ségrégation pour sécuriser l'intégration des 
systèmes de contrôle industriel (ICS) avec les systèmes d'entreprise. 
Mots clés : Systèmes de Contrôle Industriel, Segmentation, Ségrégation, Contrôle d'accès, 
Domain-Type Enforcement.  
Résumé : Sécuriser des systèmes industriels, et en particulier des systèmes intégrés au système 
d'information, devient l'une des préoccupations les plus urgentes qui inquiètent non seulement tous les 
acteurs industriels mais aussi les gouvernements. Un nombre très important d'entités industrielles et 
d'infrastructures sont si critiques que toute cyber attaque réussie contre ces entités peut causer d'énormes 
dégâts aux entreprises, à l'environnement et plus gravement à la sécurité nationale et à la sûreté des 
personnes. 
 Cette thèse étudie l'intégration des systèmes ICS avec les systèmes d'entreprise d'un point de vue sécurité. 
Notre objectif est d'étudier les vulnérabilités de sécurité des systèmes industriels intégrés et de proposer des 
modèles et des mécanismes pour améliorer leur sécurité et les protéger contre les attaques complexes. 
 Après avoir réalisé  une étude approfondie sur les vulnérabilités des systèmes ICS intégrés (IICS) et les 
solutions de sécurité existantes, nous nous sommes concentrés sur l'étude de la technique de défense en 
profondeur et son applicabilité aux systèmes ICS intégrés. Nous avons alors défini une nouvelle  méthode 
générique de segmentation pour les IICS, SONICS, qui permet de simplifier la segmentation des IICS en se 
concentrant uniquement sur les aspects qui sont réellement significatifs pour la segmentation. Nous avons 
ensuite développé une version améliorée de SONICS, RIICS, une méthode de segmentation pour les 
systèmes IICS qui comble les lacunes de SONICS en se concentrant sur le risque en plus des spécificités 
techniques et industrielles.  
 Pour compléter la méthode de segmentation, nous avons étudié les solutions de ségrégation et de contrôle 
d'accès. Nous  avons proposé un nouveau modèle de contrôle de flux basé sur DTE (Domain Type 
Enforcement) pour les systèmes ICS intégrés. 
 
Title : Segmentation and Segregation mechanisms and models to secure the integration of 
Industrial Control system (ICS) with Corporate system. 
Keywords : Integration, Industrial Control Systems, Segmentation, Segregation, Access control, 
Domain-Type Enforcement.  
 
Abstract : Securing ICS systems, and especially integrated ones, is becoming one of the most urgent 
issues that disquiets not only all industrial actors but also governments.  Very important number of industrial 
entities and infrastructures are so critical that any non contained cyber attack on these entities can cause 
huge damage to business, to environment and more gravely to national security and people safety. 
This thesis studies the integration of ICS with Corporate systems from a security standpoint. Our goal is to 
study integrated ICS systems security vulnerabilities and suggest models and mechanisms to improve their 
security and protect them against ceyberattacks. 
After conducting a study on the vulnerabilities of integrated ICS systems (IICS) and the existing security 
solutions, we focused on the study of defence  in depth technique and its applicability to integrated ICS 
systems. We defined a new generic segmentation method for IICS, SONICS, which simplifies the 
segmentation of IICS by focusing only on spects that are really significant for segmentation. We next 
developed an improved version of SONICS, RIICS (Risk based IICS Segmentation), a segmentation 
method for IICS systems that fills the SONICS gaps by focusing on risk on top of technical and industrial 
specifications. 
To complement the segmentation method, we studied segregation and access control solutions. We 
proposed a new DTE-based l (Domain Type Enforcement) flow control model for integrated ICS systems.  
 
